DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 278 798 CE 046 270

AUTHOR Peterat, Linda, Ed.
TITLE The Conversation and Company of Educated Women. A Colloquy on Home Economics Education.
INSTITUTION Illinois Univ., Urbana. Div. of Home Economics Education.
PUB DATE 86
NOTE 70p.; Papers presented at the symposium of the Special Interest Group, Home Economics Research, at the American Educational Research Association (67th, San Francisco, CA, April 16-20, 1986). Document is printed in small type.
AVAILABLE FROM Illinois Teacher of Home Economics, University of Illinois, 350 Education Bldg., 1310 South Sixth Street, Champaign, IL 61820 ($5.00).
PUB TYPE Viewpoints (120) -- Collected Works - Conference Proceedings (021)

EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS *Educational Objectives; Educational Research; Futures (of Society); *Home Economics; *Home Economics Education; Postsecondary Education; *Relevance (Education); Research Methodology; *School Role; Secondary Education; *Womens Education

ABSTRACT

The papers in this publication are the result of a symposium assessing the role of home economics in women's education. In her paper entitled "The Human Sciences and Home Economics: An Emerging Conversation," Francine H. Hultgren questions the possibilities for home economics within the human sciences. "Hestian Hermeneutics: A Lens of Analysis for Home Economics," by Patricia J. Thompson, is a paper that claims the image of Hestia, goddess of the hearth, to be a re-orienting lens of analysis in response to the question of the invisibility and devaluation of home economics. Maureen E. Kelley, in "The Female Researcher: Choice, Chance, or Coincidence?," examines the feasibility of alternate modes of research through questioning the character of the research conducted by home economists. The last two papers, "Isabel Bevier: A Different Voice for Women's Education in the Mid-West" by Linda Peterat and "Marjorie Brown: Initiating a Dialectic for Education and Everyday Life" by Gloria M. Williams, Sharon M. Strom, and Jane Plihal, examine the ideas of and visions for home economics education of the two home economics educators named in the papers' titles. Responses to the papers by Jane Roland Martin, Ted T. Aoki, and Donald A. Herrin are also included. The final chapter, which is entitled "Continuing the Conversation," is a question-and-answer section that permitted the authors of the five papers to re-open and continue discussion of the symposium topics beyond the point permitted in the original symposium. (MN)

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The Conversation and Company of Educated Women

A Colloquy on Home Economics Education

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Published by
Illinois Teacher of Home Economics
Division of Home Economics Education
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

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Introduction

The papers in this publication came together as a symposium of the Special Interest Group, Home Economics Research, at the 1986 Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association in San Francisco, California. The title of the symposium was "The Company and Conversation of Educated Women: Are Home Economists Invited?" and was inspired by two recent books addressing the history and philosophy of women's education in America: Re-claiming a conversation: The ideal of the educated woman, by Jane Roland Martin (1985) and In the company of educated women by Barbara Miller Solomon (1985). Begun as a conversation situated in the larger forum of a conference on education, the papers represent a questioning, a searching and re-searching of home economics' part in the larger conversation. This publication arose from the symposium, believing that the conversation begun was worth sustaining. It contains three responses to the symposium papers, Ted Aoki's from having attended and listened to the symposium; Donald Herrin's which served as the discussant's comments to the symposium at the conference; and Jane Roland Martin's prepared for this publication. With the desire to sustain the conversation, rather than bring closure, this publication in the section Continuing the Conversation, permits the authors of the symposium papers to re-enter and open the conversation beyond that permitted in the original symposium. The publication intends further to be an invitation to you the reader to join the conversation about home economics in education.

We join any conversation drawn by a question that while we stand in its presence calls us into question even as we speak. Francine Hultgren turns to questioning the possibilities for home economics within the human sciences as informed by Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Patricia Thompson claims the image of Hestia, goddess of the hearth, as a re-orienting lens of analysis, in response to the question of the invisibility and devaluation of home economics. Maureen Kelly examines the possibility of alternate modes of research through questioning the character of research conducted by home economists. Linda Peterat, Gloria Williams, Jane Plihal and Sharon Strom turn to the company of other home economists -- Isabel Bevier and Marjorie Brown, in questioning their ideals and visions for education. The papers in this collection are beginning a conversation on home economics through questioning possibilities opened in claiming of new orientations, new concepts, and through a re-visioning of history. Within the writing and speaking is a profound caring and hoping -- about the past, present and the future of home economics.

Editing this publication has been an exhilarating task. A task demanding listening, holding, and hearing the words of the speakers. In editing, one stands back from the impulsive rush to claim others' ideas which confirm and reflect one's own and to reject those that don't. Rather, one listens for the logic, the emerging thoughts that are searching, forming, becoming. My task as editor has not been to conform each article to a rigid format. Rather, I have attempted to edit with a sensitivity to the author, with a desire for enabling each voice to show through, to speak. In this sense, editing is encouraging of the richness and fullness of different voices.

It is in this way of the editor, that I invite you the reader to enter this conversation. A good conversation is both a speaking and a listening. The listening and hearing is both to others and to ourselves. Certain quotes are appropriate in conveying this meaning of conversation to which the reader is invited:

> A good conversation is neither a fight nor a contest. Circular in form, cooperative in manner, and constructive in intent, it is an interchange of ideas by those who see themselves not as adversaries but as human beings come together to talk and listen and learn from one another. (Martin, 1985, p. 10)

> To conduct a conversation means to allow oneself to be conducted by the object to which the partners in the conversation are directed. (Gadamer, 1975, p. 330)

Joanne Clarey, Jeanne Hutchins, Virginia Powers and Laureen Thiem, more recently speak of the power of listening in the context of research. They state:

> Learning, then, seems to be connected to allowing myself to really listen -- that is, to be vulnerable to new information, to be willing to grow and change as a result of that information, to invite consciousness-raising.... (1985, p. 152)

Linda Peterat
Autumn, 1986

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The Human Sciences and Home Economics: An Emerging Conversation

Francine H. Hultgren

What is the meaning of conversation? What is it like to enter a conversation? What does it mean for a conversation to emerge? Jane Roland Martin (1985) invites us to enter a conversation about women's education, in order that we may make enlightened judgments about and lay claim to the best possible education for both men and women. In her choice of participants for beginning the conversation, she acknowledges her image of conversation as history yielding a "natural conversational triad," wherein each succeeding philosopher addresses what the previous one had to say about women's education in order of Plato, Rousseau, and Wollstonecraft. The other two participants, Beecher and Gilman, are said to earn their place in the conversational circle because their views address the concerns and ideas of the previous three, whether or not that was their intention. Martin adds herself as a sixth participant in her task of reconstruction and interpretation of these philosophers, which she acknowledges as essential if we are to see the significance of their ideas for today and also learn from them.

As Martin invites us as readers to enter the conversation, she also suggests that the conversation circle must be enlarged through the discussion of additional philosophers, and in that enlargement, conversations must be reclaimed different from the ones she reconstructs. I have accepted her invitation of entering the conversation, and also of adding the different voices of Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Brown. My choice of these philosophers has to do with the task of reclamation she describes: the encouragement of critical examination of some of our most basic and taken for granted assumptions. In this effort of reclamation, Martin calls for a change in what counts as our source of data in order that we may extend the range of the conversation. This has important implications not only for content, but also methodology, and the structure of thought itself. This, to me, suggests a direct call for alternative ways of knowing or alternative forms of inquiry about the way in which knowledge is constructed, and in answering that call I would offer the possibilities opened up by the human sciences as informed by Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. In offering the human sciences as an alternative source of data, I must also add a fourth voice, that of Marjorie Brown, a home economist, who made the turning to human sciences possible for me, and also cleared the way for home economics to enter that conversation. In order to make these connections to the circle, I return first to the nature of conversation.

Conversation and the Dialectic of Question and Answer

Since Jane Roland Martin invites us to enter a conversation she has initiated, it would be well to place in view what she means by conversation:

> A good conversation is neither a fight nor a contest. Circular in form, cooperative in manner, and constructive in intent, it is an interchange of ideas by those who see themselves not as adversaries but as human beings come together to talk and listen and learn from one another. (p. 10)

She is careful to point out that her image of conversation is not debate, wherein a single question is argued over two clear cut positions. In this regard she is similar to what Gadamer (1975) would have us see about the nature of conversation: as we test the assertions of the other person, we do not try to weaken them but to strengthen them, and in doing so we find the true strength in the subject itself. I enter Gadamer into the conversation, then, first for how he might enlarge our meaning of conversation itself, and second for his contribution to the human sciences, particularly the way in which conversation leads to understanding.

Our starting point in this conversation is with a text, the participants in Martin's book; therefore we might look to Gadamer's distinction between real conversation (as that between partners face to face) and hermeneutical conversation (as that between one partner as text and one partner as interpreter). The work, then, of hermeneutics can be described as a conversation with the text which takes place through language:

> Thus that which is handed down in literary form is brought back out of the alienation in which it finds itself and into the living presence of conversation, whose fundamental procedure is always question and answer. (Gadamer, 1975, p. 331)

To Gadamer, then, the art of conducting a real conversation is the art of asking questions, a dialectic, which involves maintaining an orientation toward openness,

wherein the fundamental relation is that of question and answer.

> To conduct a conversation means to allow oneself to be conducted by the object to which the partners in the conversation are directed. It requires that one does not try to out-argue the other person, but that one really considers the weight of the other person's opinion. Hence it is an art of testing. But the art of testing is the art of questioning. For we have seen that to question means to lay open, to place in the open. (p. 330)

The central place of questioning is seen in relation to understanding as Gadamer quotes Collingwood: "We can understand a text only when we have understood the question to which it is an answer" (p. 333). What are the questions, then, that the texts of Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer give answers to with respect to the emerging conversation I see with home economics and the human sciences? I return first to the basic questions that each of them pose as their major project: What is the appropriate science for the study of human phenomena? (Dilthey) What is the meaning of "being?" (Heidegger) and How is understanding possible? (Gadamer). What is placed before us in these questions? One can see in each of these questions an opening of the way by which we understand living human experience. The questions are a part of the conversation engaged in by those who have turned to the human sciences due to increasing dissatisfaction with the objectifying attitude of the natural sciences. Home economics has entered this conversation, and it is the intent of the paper to display the foundation for the emergence of this voice in relation to the understanding gained of the human sciences through the texts of Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer.

There are those who might consider home economics a mere child in the conversation with the human sciences. I would borrow from Maxine Greene (1985) in response to such thinking: "This surely points to the importance of our freeing children to tell their stories, not only so that we can hear them but so they can make meaningful the birth of their own rationality" (p. 77). Her concern is about how "newcomer voices" (the young, women, different cultural groups) might be enabled to join "culture's conversation," and the responsibility of education in that process. Home economics might be one of those newcomers (at least to be recognized as such), but as the historical tracings of the profession are illuminated, it might be seen that we have been a part of that conversation since our formation. Although Greene was not referring to home economics (and probably not even conscious of that possibility), her reference to the importance of children's modes of ordering lived reality in the context of family, speaks right to the central core of our mission. So whether we see home economics as a child in this conversation, or see its central mission as the development of human potential through the family, the rationale for inclusion is clear. As the human sciences are a focus of this conversation, the meaning of the term must be clarified and traced to its foundations.

Human Sciences and the Realm of the Human

Sharing in a conversation as human scientists we participate in a common project of exploring human existence as it is lived. Human science, then, takes as its starting point all of human life and all of life's expressions.

> At the broadest level, the human sciences investigate all of the experiences, activities, constructs, and artifacts that would not now exist, or would not even have existed, if human beings had not existed...Thus the object of inquiry is broad, and it includes the study of personal consciousness and experience, as well as social, political and economic systems. There is an essential link between the appearance of human beings and these expressions, and consequently the expressions--including personal consciousness--are viewed as human related entities rather than as things in themselves. The human sciences explore the realm of the human. (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 289)

"Geisteswissenschaften" was the German term that came to be associated with Dilthey's meaning of the human sciences as it was opposed to "Naturwissenschaften," the natural sciences. As the existential question was raised (What does it mean to be human?) it was recognized that to be human means to exist in a different way from positivism and behaviorism. Dilthey contended that the human sciences had to look to new modes for interpretation of human phenomena, models that would be derived from the character of lived experience (Palmer, 1969). To Dilthey's question, then, we turn.

What is the Appropriate Science for the Study of Human Phenomena? (Dilthey's Contribution to the Conversation)

In Dilthey we find the concern about life and what we experience in our activities and reflections as we live out our personal histories (Polkinghorne, 1983). It was his belief that life could not be understood by using explanatory models that classify events according to laws of nature. The task of the human sciences as conceived by Dilthey was to

> examine the life experience both in its individual manifestations and in its social expressions ...What human scientists must seek to make explicit, then, are the principles of organization. Dilthey called these principles "categories of life." They are the processes by means of which experience appears as related and meaningful. (Polkinghorne, 1983, p. 27)

Dilthey emphasizes, then, that the task of human science is to make explicit the organizing themes that render experience meaningful. Although Dilthey was in search of an alternative method for making these experiences meaningful to the human sciences, he never developed a consistent approach to his concern about "life categories" that was appropriate to the human element. He was still driven by the need to make knowledge objectively valid, an expression of the scientific ideal from which he could not escape.

It has been suggested that what human science researchers share in common is that they have found their disciplines to be problematic and that they have moved to confront and resolve that problem (Masek, 1986). Home economics has moved to confront the problem of being held by modes of rationality appropriate to the natural sciences as it seeks to understand the human qualities of individuals and families. Although we see evidence of this confrontation by home economists today engaged in the doing of human science inquiry (Bubolz, 1985; Coomer, 1985; Copa, 1984; Hultgren, 1982, 1985a; Jax, 1981; Peterat, 1983; Plihal, Strom, & Williams, 1985; Wilsman, 1985), Brown (1985a) has documented well the emergence of an alternative or revolutionary view early in the profession. She found evidence of two distinctly different views or aims of home economics that were apparent in the early Lake Placid Conferences (1899-1909) as the profession was formed. One view emphasized scientific management in the work of the home to achieve efficiency and economy, while the other emphasized developing human capacities through the home so that men and women would participate in society for the good of advancing human freedom. We gain a sense of the scientific rationality through such texts as the following:

> One of the greatest needs of the country was the appreciation of what science might do for the housewife in her daily home keeping, in making her work both easier and more efficient. (Richards, 1908, cited in Brown, 1985a, p. 250)

> That man is a part of nature and subject to nature's fundamental law is the lesson of evolution. That man may learn to understand and control the working of these laws, to a limited extent, is his proud prerogative...He needs to know the laws of nature that he may work with and not against them.... (Richards, 1908, cited in Brown, 1985a, p. 253)

On the other hand was the view of home economics responding to human needs as families engaged in a socio-cultural world of "meanings, language, knowledge, social relations, norms and ways of doing things..." (Brown, 1985, p. 257). Scientific management was the dominant view, while the alternative view was one of concern for human capacities which called for different kinds of knowledge as found in the tradition of the human sciences through its focus on the everyday life of persons in relation to a larger socio-cultural context. This alternative view was expressed in the Proceedings of the Lake Placid Conferences:

> We owe a debt of gratitude to the schools which have thru their practical side gained the public ear, and interested it and educated it thru the interest to broader ideals of everyday life. (Chown, 1902, cited in Brown, 1985a, p. 259)

> To change the college course for women with a view to giving them a training adequate to the needs of domestic life would be as disappointing as futile...The demand for home economics which will be met in time is of a different kind. It is the demand which shows that the making of bread is not an essential part of the making of a home...that the activities are far wider than physical well-being...that home economics must always be regarded in the light of its relation to the general social system, that men and women are alike concerned in understanding the processes, activities, obligations, and opportunities which make the home and family effective parts of the social fabric. (Talbot, 1902, cited in Brown, 1985a, p. 262)

> There is no one consolation, no panacea for the problems of the family. These are diverse and must be dealt with in a multiplicity of ways, study, analysis, constructive policy, almost countless practical activities must be undertaken and pusht steadily, but all these things get their inspiration and their meaning from a common purpose not only to preserve family unity but to raise it to a higher plane...which shall be an inspiration to the better life physically, socially, ethically. (Vincent, 1908, cited in Brown, 1985a, p. 267)

As Brown relates the case of their common themes, she suggests that their view of home economics was concerned with what happened to human beings more than a control of technical knowledge. As she summarizes the revolutionary element of Alice Chown, Marion Talbot, and George Vincent she sees them

> challenging the existing unfree relations in the family and in society, the development of reflective capacities in individuals through home economics, and, necessarily, therefore, home economics as a reflective field of endeavor concerned with the development both of human capacities and of a society which would function in the common interests of its members. (Brown, 1985a, p. 270)

Although not identified as a human science (home science however was suggested in the early years), home economics had in its root formation a concern for the significance of the home in developing the "possibilities of humanity," the realm of the human. Just as Dilthey is credited with being an architect of the anti-positivist movement in the human sciences as he lived out his project from 1833-1911, the early voices of home economists could be said to be architects of a similar spirit in home economics that came on the heels of Dilthey (1899-1909). Dilthey's "categories of life" (processes/structures by which experience is organized and made meaningful) were expressed as relationships of self and world, power, part and whole, means and ends; and development (Polkinghorne, 1983). Such were the "categories of life" described by Andrews (cited in Brown, 1985) that were seen as the personal interactions within the family of habits, attitudes, and personal relations which give structure to family life, but which are also experienced in relation to the larger social fabric.

So given that these voices were a part of the early "cultural conversation," why have they not been more widely recognized? Gadamer (1975) says that the first condition of the act of conversation is to ensure that the other person is with us. Is it that our texts have just not been accessible to others outside the profession with whom we would like to converse, or have we been purposely excluded due to the nature of what we attend to (the reproductive aspects of society as Jane Martin would call them)? Might it also be that despite our concern for human development we have been single minded in our pursuit of that knowledge (drawing on the natural sciences for legitimation of what we do)? This goes back to the original debate of whether the human sciences should emulate the methods of the natural sciences or develop their own methods? It was Dilthey's project to break away from the natural sciences in the study of human phenomena, but in his search for "a method" he was held by the standards of objectively verifiable knowledge. A similar tension was expressed by early home economists, wherein the concern was expressed "that the kind of inquiry in home economics be one of selecting and organizing knowledge appropriate to the purpose of the profession rather than absorbing their disciplines as if they were home economics" (Brown, 1985a, p. 274). If we truly seek to understand the themes of our life world experiences in the structures of family and society we would do well to heed the caution of Aanstoos and Arons (1984): "Human existence is best approached on its own terms, that is, with foundations and methods appropriate to it rather than borrowed uncritically from other pre-existing sciences" (p. 3). As we search out the meaning of human existence and what it means to be human, Heidegger offers some illumination about the basic form of human existence, understanding, as approached through hermeneutics, the foundation of which was laid by Dilthey.

What is the Meaning of Being? (Heidegger's Contribution to the Conversation)

Where as Dilthey sought in hermeneutics a method for providing an objective understanding of life expressions or categories, Heidegger (1962) sought to show that understanding is the basic form of human existence. For Heidegger, understanding is not the way we know the world, but it is the way we are. Understanding, then, is ontological; it is not something to be possessed but a mode of being-in-the-world. In a previous paper (Hultgren, 1985b) I raised the question, how has the lack of understanding of being been particularly significant for women and what does Heidegger offer as a way of access? To Heidegger, being is disclosed in lived experience and it escapes the conceptualized categories of idea centered thinking. He offers a theory of understanding that emerges in existence (an ontological disclosure). As I read Martin's book, I was caught by her reference to Clark's description of reproductive processes (rearing and nurturing children, caring for family, running the household) as the "ontological basement," and I was brought back to the claim I developed in that paper that we must look to an ontological grounding for an emancipatory education as well as an epistemological one, and that Heidegger might provide the way of access.

The foundation of being is sought in relation to being-in-the-world and not in relation with another. Ricoeur (1981) notes in this regard that Heidegger de-psychologizes understanding of being by turning to world rather than another. What is the significance of this shift from another to world? For Heidegger it is where the ontology of understanding may begin, not "being-with-another who would duplicate our subjectivity, but being-in-the-world" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 56). Ricoeur helped me grasp this fundamental locus of understanding for Heidegger, in which he expresses the basic state of our Being, as derived from inan, "to reside," and habitare, "to dwell" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 80). It is our inhabiting the world that makes understanding possible. Heidegger's theory of understanding seeks to

display how we must first find ourselves in there (as in-the-world) and feel ourselves in a certain manner. Through the use of feelings or states of mind, Heidegger then seeks to disclose a reality more fundamental than the subject-object relation by means of those revelatory experiences. Understanding, then, is sought in one's position within being. Phenomenology is for Heidegger the means of disclosing being, which calls forth the personal experience of being-in-the-world. The real object of phenomenological analysis and description consists in bringing to light, through language and speaking, those elements, which though hidden initially, are in fact the foundation of the revealed traits of that which shows itself to us (Kockelmans, 1965). Phenomenology, then, is our way of access to the lifeworld. As phenomenology is a means of being led by the phenomena through a way of access genuinely belonging to it, hermeneutics interprets what is encountered and therefore brings about understanding of being. Heidegger maintains that to be human is to be interpretive, for the very nature of the human realm is interpretive. Being human is a laying open of what is hidden as we approach the question of what does it mean to be?

If understanding, then, arises from finding ourselves in relation to the world, and phenomenology is a way of access to that revealing, the function of understanding is to orientate self in a situation, and in so doing, it is not concerned with comprehending a fact, but rather with grasping one's own possibilities for being, within the context of the lifeworld in which one exists. I would posit that the ontological intent of Heidegger's understanding would make a significant contribution to women and men realizing their potential. "What is edified in phenomenological theorizing is not the epistemological principle of impersonal, valid knowledge, but the ontological principle of personal, authentic being" (van Manen, 1984, p. 11). The central existential element in Heidegger's ontological analysis of being is care, wherein he asserts that "being-in-the-world has the stamp of care" (1962, p. 243). It is care that expresses the intentionality of human existence.

How does this Heideggerian conception of care, then, relate to some of our recent calls to care such as we find in Carol Gilligan's (1983) "ethics of care," in which the elements she addressed are caring, concern and connectedness? Although she does not seek to generalize either sex through the interpretation of male and female voices, the experiences of males and females point up the difference in psychological development -- women defining themselves more in the context of human relation and in terms of ability to care as nurturer, caretaker, and helpmate in man's life cycle. How apparent it is that our way of being is in relation to another, the expression of which has arisen of course from certain social historical contexts. What would happen if we could de-psychologize our way of being as Heidegger would have it by first finding our self in relation to a world that was not gender determined?

Jane Roland Martin (1985) begins to clear the way for this kind of being in her delineation of the reproductive and productive processes of society. Her display of these processes is in reference to the place of activity--the reproductive ones (associated with nurturing capacities) carried on in the private world of home and domesticity, and the productive ones (associated with objective analytic capacities) carried on in the public world of politics and work. It is interesting to note the relation here being "world"--as distinguished by private and public. If we invoke a Heideggerian sense of care here--we would be concerned with a manner of dealing with things (equipment) and persons by being-in-the-world, the presence of others discovered at the same time because they are involved with pieces of equipment in which concern is the way of relating. If we were to look at equipment here as the tasks and equipment or other things shared in the work of the home and work outside the home--the presence of others is shared in concern because they would be involved together alongside one another. This being-with-one-another Heidegger speaks of as "solicitude" which can take two forms. A negative way of being-with occurs when persons are just doing the same thing as someone else, in which distance and reserve keep persons apart in a sense of mistrust. In this position of concern, one "leaps in" for another and "takes care away" (1962, p. 158). One then becomes dominant and one dependent in this way of relating. One disburdens the other of care. This might be likened to the male-female dichotomy that has occurred with respect to home and work in the sex role socialization sense. On the other hand a positive form of solicitude occurs when persons devote themselves to the same affair in common wherein persons become authentically bound together which frees the other in freedom for self. Heidegger speaks of this form of care as "leaping ahead and liberating" (p. 159), wherein leaping ahead of the other rather than for, one does not take away care but rather gives it back authentically. This helps the other to become transparent to self in care and to be free for it. This presents quite a different possibility for learning when we think about ways of being and not only ways of knowing as males and females are engaged in both reproductive and productive aspects of society.

The Heideggerian possibilities I find most compelling for further development within the human science concern for human capacities and freedom, are the relation to world in developing understanding of the self and potentiality for being, and a way of relating that is full

of care. As self is realized in care, which implies a way of encountering others and things that discloses being through a communion made possible in genuine sharing, males and females become comrades rather than competitors in the private work of the family as well as the public work of family and society. Through the help of phenomenology as a way of access, things become manifest as they are, without forcing our own categories on them. The implication for a theory of understanding that brings about realization of potential for women and men is that interpretation is not grounded only in human consciousness and human categories, but in the revealing of what is encountered, the reality that comes to meet us in the very experiencing of the encountering, and the meaning that is made of it in a lived way. It is not sufficient, then, to view knowledge only from an epistemological sense, as we want to do more than catalogue reality; questions of knowledge require a reference back to the lifeworld of persons for ontological grounding as well. By maintaining a perspective on the lived world of experience, we are able to examine and grasp the structures which have given meaning to our way of being in the world. It calls for a relearning of the way in which we look at the world and find ourselves in the world, by reawakening our basic experience of it.

If I now can add my third person to the "natural conversational triad," Gadamer would help us look at hermeneutics and the human sciences as evolving from Dilthey's concern with method for human phenomena and Heidegger's concern with ontological understanding, adding the element of the historicality of understanding. To Gadamer's fundamental question, then, we turn.

How is Understanding Possible? (Gadamer's Contribution to the Conversation)

Gadamer (1975) starts from the premise that understanding as it occurs in the human sciences, is essentially historical. He seeks to show that "understanding is not so much a method by means of which the enquiring mind approaches some selected object and turns it into objective knowledge, as something of which a prior condition is its being situated within a process of tradition" (p. 276). The meaning of his connection to tradition is found in his explanation of the hermeneutical attitude:

> The element of tradition in our historical, hermeneutical attitude, is fulfilled in the fact that we share fundamental prejudices with tradition. Hermeneutics must start from the position that a person seeking to understand something has a relation to the object that comes into language in the transmitted text. (p. 262)

The really critical question of hermeneutics, then, he says, is to distinguish the true prejudices by which we understand, from the false ones by which we misunderstand. A hermeneutical situation is determined by the prejudices we bring with us, which in turn, constitute the horizon of a particular present. As I seek to illuminate the emergence of a conversation between home economics and the human sciences, Gadamer's contribution of our encounter with the past (through the testing of our prejudices) to understand the tradition from which we have come is particularly significant. Brown's prejudgments (prejudices) about home economics are a starting point:

> First, throughout its history, home economics has been a field of study not concerned with knowing only for the sake of knowing, but concerned with action which makes reflective use of knowledge in service to members of society. I am also assuming that the tradition of home economics, with its action-oriented concern for the everyday lives of people in the home and the development and happiness of individual family members, is to be continued. When a professional group makes use of knowledge to provide a service claimed to be of benefit to members of society, it places itself in a political moral role...Further, I am accepting the belief of home economists, at least since the early Lake Placid Conference, that because the family is part of the larger society, the development and well-being of individuals in the family and their lives as a family are affected by the historical-social conditions in which the family lives. (Brown, 1985a, p. 6)

The similarity of Brown's historical conditions of family to Gadamer's historicality of understanding is apparent in the following passage:

> Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self evident way in family, society and state in which we live. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life. (Gadamer, 1975, p. 245)

If we take the primacy of historical consciousness in understanding to its grounding within a tradition, we are led to the eighteenth century idea of self-formation or cultivation (Bildung) which was, according to Gadamer, the idea and atmosphere breathed by the human sciences of the nineteenth century. Tracing the evolving meaning of this concept (Bildung) central to the human sciences, and the question central to historical hermeneutics (where is the ground of the legitimacy of prejudices?), we can readily see that the prejudice of home economics articulated by

Brown is grounded in the human sciences. The conceptual meaning of "Bildung" underwent several historical modifications from the idea of "natural shape," to the idea of culture and the properly human way to develop one's natural capacities, to the idea of formation and the inner processes of becoming. The most profound meaning maintained in relation to the human sciences, however, is the "universal nature of human Bildung to constitute itself as a universal intellectual being" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 13). The essential thrust of this prejudice which has significance for home economics is that every single individual

> finds in the language customs and institutions of his people a pre-given body of materials which, as in learning to speak, he has to make his own. Thus every individual is always engaged in the process of Bildung (self-formation)...inasmuch as the world into which he is growing is one that is humanly constituted through language and custom. (Gadamer, 1975, p. 15)

The mission of home economics articulated by Brown and Paolucci (1979) echoes this essential notion of self-formation:

> To enable families, both as individual units and generally as a social institution, to build and maintain systems of action which lead (1) to maturing in individual self-formation and (2) to enlightened cooperative participation in the critique and formulation of social goals and means for accomplishing them. (p. 23)

As Brown (1985b) has continued her unveiling of the intellectual heritage of home economics, she brings further to light the central thrust of this prejudice through the critical hermeneutic intent of the human sciences:

> As a small group, the family is one in which communication through ordinary language in everyday life is central; it consists of speaking subjects who, whether consciously or not, influence the self-understanding, the motivations, the feelings, and the action of members both within the family and outside. There is obvious significance of reflective consideration of meanings in interaction with children; their world takes on meaning with the reflective use of language as they experience that world...Identifying, understanding, and seeking to come to terms with the day-to-day problems the family faces within its own borders as well as in conjunction with other members of society require communication using the conceptual tools which comprehension of word-meanings and the structure of language brings. (p. 880)

As Gadamer provides a grounding for home economics and the human sciences in relation to the concept of Bildung, he also contributes another major element in our emerging conversation that has to do with the central thrust of his philosophic hermeneutics: its linkage to the tradition of practical philosophy as rooted in Aristotle's practical reasoning and the relationship of the universal and the particular. He sees the hermeneutical problem as clearly different from the detached theoretical knowledge, and therein he suggests that hermeneutics in the human sciences stands close to moral knowledge. The concern is for understanding that is a form of phronesis, which deals with what is variable and always requires deliberation, choice and reasons that are morally and intellectually defensible. This practical intent is the foundation for his hermeneutic understanding that is characteristic of the ongoing interpretation of tradition through the confronting of prejudices in which past and present are constantly fused, as choices are made in the action of everyday life. The chief task of his hermeneutic philosophy becomes one of justifying practical and political reason against the domination of technology based on the rationality of empirical science. The practical/moral intent of home economics is clear in the way in which it seeks to help families bring about a more democratic society through its disclosure of dominating social practices that distort communication or limit the self-formation of persons, family and ultimately society. Jane Martin poses the question: Is education for rearing children and caring for home and family desirable and should this education be placed on par with citizenship education? The answer is found in the prejudice of home economics: family and citizenship cannot be separated as they are both intertwined in the concept of Bildung (self-formation) that is the mission of home economics.

The Question to Which These Voices in the Conversation Are An Answer

As was suggested by Gadamer, we understand a text only when we have understood the question to which it is an answer. If we combine the voices of Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer and Brown as represented in their texts, it seems to me that they give answer to the hermeneutic question for home economics: What is the ground of the legitimacy of our prejudices that gives rise to our rationality and conversation that leads to understanding in our concern for the human qualities of individuals and families? The text that seems to get underneath or behind that question, is that of Maxine Greene and her concern for freeing children to tell their stories. When we truly "hear" children, we approach them as a "Thou" (Gadamer, 1975), listening to what they have

to say and not overlooking their claim to knowledge or truth. Even if home economics is considered a "child" in the conversation with the human sciences, these voices address the way in which we belong together in a tradition that is grounded in "Bildung" (self-formation) and this means being able to listen to one another: we are partners in the conversation. As Gadamer says, "the voice that speaks to us from the past...itself poses a question and places our meaning in openness. In order to answer this question, we, of whom the question is asked, must ourselves begin to ask questions" (p. 337). We must continue to pose questions of our prejudices and strive for a reasoned historical self understanding. We must ask questions of our verbal and conceptual history. As we draw upon the insights of Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer, with the help of Brown, we open ourselves to what tradition has to say to us. In the working out of Dilthey's question (What is the appropriate science for the study of human phenomena?) we continue to strive for a way of inquiry that does justice to the realm of the human but moves beyond the hold of the "objectifying scientific ideal" from which he could not escape. It might be that we begin to recognize with Gadamer that the question is not one of method, but rather the objectives of knowledge, as he looks to answer the question (How is understanding possible?). As we turn to the historical nature of our understanding, we then might begin to recognize with Heidegger (What is the meaning of being?) that understanding is ontological--our way of being in the world. It is not sufficient to view knowledge from an epistemological sense only. If we desire to raise from the "ontological basement" the knowledge base we contribute to (the reproductive and productive aspects of society), we would do well to look at the lifeworld of males and females in the ense of Bildung, as grounded ontologically as well as epistemologically. This presents us with a different possibility for learning, as the self is realized in care and males and females become comrades rather than competitors in the private work of the family as well as the public work of family and society. We could, then, see the possibilities, along with Brown, for the study of the family from the mode of a critical hermeneutics that has a practical intent, the contribution of home economics to the cultural conversation through the human sciences.

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Hestian Hermeneutics: A Lens of Analysis for Home Economics

Patricia J. Thompson

Scholars use the metaphor "lens of analysis" to mean a corrective to unstructured or previously biased vision, an aid to focusing, whereby data can be organized so its meaning becomes intelligible. Historically, the lens has been masculist; it has been ground to bring only knowledge identified, validated, and legitimated by males into focus. Such a monocular view affords (to use Jane Roland Martin's (1985) phrase) "pride of place" to male experience and achievements and to the societal processes associated with men. If knowledge is power, then knowledge used to reinforce male dominance, or patriarchy, becomes an adjunct of patriarchal power.

Feminist and women scholars in all disciplines have challenged this patriarchal perspective. They have polished their lens to bring into focus the missing text of female experience. They seek to rectify the masculist bias of patriarchy by including women in their way of seeing. In so doing, they reveal aspects of human experience previously hidden from view. In every discipline, the new scholarship on women has rendered previously under-reported and under-valued female experience visible. We now confront the task of making sense of what we see and attaching meaning to it. Validating and legitimating the new knowledge will be a formidable task. A masculist lens of analysis cannot do justice to the data. Nor can we expect structures that reinforce patriarchal power to be hospitable to new knowledge that challenges its legitimacy.

This paper proposes an alternative to gender-bound lenses of analysis because either or both masculist and feminist lenses are too limited to focus adequately on the new knowledge. It is also necessary to explain the unique position in which women and men in a female defined discipline such as home economics find themselves in relation to male defined disciplines which incorporate a masculist view of the world and assume it to be human.

Gender defined thinking is so obvious. Making the switch from masculist to feminist thinking seems a logical step to binocular, or gender balanced ways of seeing. Yet by accepting genderized categories uncritically, women, like men, may screen out other aspects of human experience. In adopting these categories, everything must be made to "fit." But it doesn't always work. Why? Because we are simply exchanging (or reversing) the premises of a male-ground analytic lens for a new one ground by feminists. Consequently, there is little shift in what we see. It is somewhat like looking at a mirror image of the world of men. We do not bring into fresh focus the entire experience of women and men, past, present, and cross-culturally, in a way that stands up to critical analysis. Arguments from either masculist or feminist points of view founder on perceptions and definitions of gender, on "woman's place" and "man's place" in the scheme of things.

Both categories, sex and gender, force us to treat females and males as polar opposites rather than as variants on a single human continuum. Such categories become conceptual traps that hold us to a way of thinking from which we have sought to escape. By contrast, if we accept human sexuality as a continuum of identity, appearance, and behavior (which are socially and culturally constructed) we still find that "feminine" males are more powerful in the public world than "feminine" females! For women to succeed in a man's world, they must adopt characteristics that reflect male defined experience and values. For women, this is a no win situation. As I hope to show, blind acceptance of gender bound categories of experience offers too limited a frame of reference to fully explain the "dilemma of domesticity" which frustrates women's attempts to be treated as men's equals (Hoye & Merrell, 1983).

The Limitations of a Gender-Ground Lens of Analysis

Gender dichotomous thinking produces false dilemmas that are not always easy to recognize or resolve (Thompson, 1984b). While it is inappropriate to address these here, suffice it to say that gender-bound thinking leads us to argue about the wrong questions with the right rhetoric and the right questions with the wrong rhetoric. This notion is reinforced by Martin's (1985) observation that "the assumptions with which we approach our problem are so deeply entrenched in patriarchal culture that we do not even recognize their existence" (p. 176). To work our way out of patriarchy's conceptual traps, we must challenge assumptions that have, for millennia, been taken for granted aspects of our everyday world and have been labeled human. In claiming an education for women (and, by association, men) we must begin by challenging self-evident propositions.

Martin (1985) lays out with great perception and elegance selected ideas from Plato's Republic (Book 5), Rousseau's Emile (Book 5), Wollstonecraft's Vindication, Beecher's Treatise, and Gilman's Herland, and she discusses their implications for the ideal of the educated woman. She introduces the concepts of the reproductive and productive processes of society to differentiate two main emphases in the history of social and educational thought. She includes among the reproductive processes not just conception and birth but also the rearing of children more or less to maturity as well as such associated activities as tending the sick, taking care of family needs, and running a household. She includes political, economic, and cultural activities among the productive processes. She concludes that education geared specifically to either the reproductive or the productive processes (at the expense of the other) will be an inadequate ideal for an educated person. Therefore, an education formulated solely for the purpose of keeping women in bondage to the reproductive processes or men in thrall to the productive processes will fail on account of a person's need to live a life that embraces both. With this, I cannot disagree. The failures of educational philosophers in the past to provide a rounded or fully human approach to education can be viewed as attempts to perpetuate gender-bound educational stereotypes which support patriarchy.

Martin discloses an essential dilemma in the education of women and men, namely the need for each to be exposed to subject matter traditionally associated with the socialization and education of members of the "other" sex. By identifying the reproductive and productive processes of society and seeing their relation in classic educational thought to the gender division of labor, Martin provides an important contribution for dealing with this problem. Nevertheless, her dual classification does not explain or account for which (and when) these processes take precedence in an individual's life and what in sum (or on mature reflection) is of greatest significance, meaning, or value to the individual, family, community, state, nation, or world. Martin's insights provide a major step toward a better understanding of a totally human education that must account for both reproductive and productive processes. However, I must point out that these categories transcend gender in their long-term implications. In order to see this clearly, we must remove both the blinders of masculist assumptions and the hoped for correction of feminist assumptions.

Required: A Perceptual Shift

Sex and gender are relatively obvious. It is comparatively easy to categorize and classify human differences along the alternative vectors of male/female, masculine/feminine. However, by accepting such a first cut in sorting the deck of human experience, we become trapped by sex and gender categories and what they represent in a particular culture, society, and time period. We are then kept from adopting a more comprehensive view of humankind. To avoid this, we must retrace, albeit briefly, some assumptions about the male world that are accepted uncritically and which, when perpetuated in education, operate to the detriment of both women and men.

To refresh my memory and retrace my own educational experience, I return to Van Loon's The Story of Mankind, first published in 1926 (the year I was born) and which my mother had given me when I was twelve or thirteen years old as a readable introduction to world history. Van Loon asked:

> How...did the ancient Greeks have time to look after their families and their businesses if they were forever running to the market-place to discuss affairs of state?...In all matters of government, the Greek democracy recognized only one class of citizens -- the freemen. Every Greek city was composed of a small number of free born citizens, a large number of slaves and a sprinkling of foreigners. (1954, p. 59-60)

Sometimes, in periods of crisis, male barbarians might have citizenship rights conferred on them. But in Athens, the status of freeman was based on the status of a man's father and grandfather. Women did not qualify as freemen. Therefore, irrespective of who ruled the city (by and for the freemen), it was made possible by the work of multitudes of slaves who outnumbered the free citizens at the rate of five or six to one. It was they "who performed those tasks to which we modern people must devote most of our time and energy if we wish to provide for our families and pay the rent of our apartments" (Van Loon, 1954, p. 61). Van Loon wrote:

> The slaves did all the cooking and baking and candle-stick making of the entire city. They were the tailors and the carpenters and the jewelers and the school-teachers and the book-keepers and they tended the store and looked after the factory while the master went to the public meeting to discuss questions of war and peace or visited the theatre to see the latest play of Aeschylus or hear a discussion of the revolutionary ideas of Euripides, who had dared to express certain doubts upon the omnipotence of the great god Zeus. (1954, p. 61)

Thus ancient Athens was a city-wide men's club, a nice place to live if you were a hereditary freeman who could accept slavery as a precondition to a civilized (or at least a nonbarbarian) life. The means to this end was

provided at the expense of the labor of slaves (female and male) and women (wives, mothers, daughters, concubines) of the household. Greek homes, food, clothing, and items of display were the work of slaves. To preserve their freedom, the Greeks advocated moderation, or voluntary simplicity. While, as Van Loon says, they may have "reduced their daily needs to the lowest possible point" (p. 63), nowhere had they eliminated them entirely, nor did they discuss taking up these everyday tasks for themselves as part of the price of being human, a condition prior to being Athenian.

The systematic denial of the life of necessity, of involvement in the tasks of everyday life, contributes both to the institution of slavery and the invisibility of women. It requires the perpetuation not only of a masculist ideal but an elitist one. Who can deny that the touted intellectual life of the Athenian freeman was maintained at the cost of denying freedom to others? We must ask about a system of thought that accepts unconditionally and uncritically the unfreedom of the many as the price to be paid for the freedom of a privileged few. The persistent need to address the perennial problems of everyday life, of the despised "life of necessity," weaves like a lost notion in the intellectual history of Western culture. We might call it a "lost form" ignored by Plato and his followers. Yet these comprise the very activities essential for everyday survival, on which philosophers, plowmen, poets, and plumbers rely. Furthermore, they embrace both reproductive and productive processes. The model here proposed is an alternative to those built on these age-old masculist assumptions that are both sexist and elitist.

The Hestian/Hermean Model

To gain a fresh perspective, I have turned in part to the work of the Annales historian Fernand Braudel. One goal of the Annales school was to reconstruct the past to recover the lost dimensions of everyday life and, in so doing, to demasculinize history (Stoianovich, 1976). In the Annales model, the two spheres of human action are the private, identified with Hestia, the Greek goddess of hearth and home, and the public, identified with Hermes, the Greek messenger god. Elsewhere I have detailed the relevance of this model for home economics and made the argument for home economics as a Hestian discipline (Thompson, 1986a; 1986b).

The Hestian sphere has a unique claim on our attention because it reflects the consistent concern of home economists with matters related to family, child care, shelter, food, and clothing (hearth and home). I refer to these as Hestian concerns, which arise from our basic needs as human beings. The Hestian space/sphere is the arena of everyday necessity with its unremitting daily demands, including biological, social, mental, intellectual, and spiritual needs, all of which have a private, personal, and intimate character. The Athenian male establishment ignored baseline survival needs by delegating such essential work to others. They were then "free" to address concerns in the privileged public space/sphere. Their privilege existed at the cost of nonprivilege. Hestian work, required for the survival of the individual and the family, was devalued in favor of Hermean work, required for the survival of the state.

This elitist dualism, as much as the gender division of labor, is a conceptual trap in which scholars are caught at the expense of consistency and clarity. The Hestian and Hermean spheres are not tightly boundaried. Systems thinking, an integral part of home economics, reinforces our comprehension of the Hestian and Hermean spheres as interactive, interdependent systems. Transactions take place across the systems' boundaries. The Hestian sphere can be conceptualized as a life support system mediated by the family, the institution that controls the private, domestic space of the household. The Hermean sphere can be conceptualized as a power system in the control of such public institutions as business, government, the press, and the church. To use Martin's terminology, the Hestian sphere has concentrated on society's reproductive processes while the productive processes have come increasingly under the control of institutions in the Hermean sphere.

The Hermeneutic Task

Having recognized the missing text of female experience and superimposed a Hestian/Hermean lens of analysis as a corrective to categories previously labeled by gender, we are challenged to interpret what we see. Hermeneutics is broadly understood to be the study of the interpretation of texts. A hermeneutic study belies a static, time-bound interpretation of texts. For example, if the bible had not been the first text to be subjected to hermeneutic study, it would have been a dead issue long ago because people could not relate to a world of deserts, shepherds, and bearded prophets. Texts must be reinterpreted for their time with their meaning freed from outdated language and recast in a language comprehensible to a new audience. The historical method provides us with a rediscovery of women's experience. The hermeneutic method provides us with reinterpretations of that experience. For now, we will pose this problem for the understanding of texts uniquely tied to the lifeworld of women, especially Catharine Beecher's Treatise on Domestic Economy (1841). A Hestian hermeneutic is, therefore, uniquely related to the minds and lives of women as they

experienced the Hestian sphere and preserved and communicated that experience in texts.

A hermeneutic designed to disclose and interpret the Hestian experience may be one way to take women out of the "ontological basement," a phrase Martin uses frequently. The hermeneutic tradition has been decidedly masculist. Hence it is taken for granted that texts will be reinterpreted from one masculist tradition to another. Indeed, this is one method for transmitting patriarchal culture. The Hestian domain, however, is singularly keyed to female language. By contrast, socialization in a scholarly discipline requires that ordinary language be replaced with a formal language (jargon) known only to the practitioners of the discipline. A Hestian hermeneutic must, therefore, address the deliberate mystification brought about by masculist language and conceptual categories. Most scholars (male and female) are trained in Hermean language. It becomes the taken for granted or accepted scholarly vocabulary, whether or not its meaning relates to real world phenomena or only to the phenomena of a previously established abstract discourse.

Women scholars are also trained in Hermean discourse and led to accept Hermean abstractions uncritically. Feminist scholars are attempting to create new concepts and new categories by which female experience can be ordered and understood. However in the past, elitist education for women has been largely Hermean, that is, an education in male-defined categories of experience and thought. But the hermeneutic imagination is not confined by gender. We are not restricted to a literal recreation of the past and standard interpretations of texts by women and men. Most importantly, we must ask how a Hermean standard can properly be applied to a Hestian text. Women scholars have challenged the masculist hold on language. We can now focus on aspects of interpretation appropriate for decoding the meaning of Hestian texts.

What is Hestian language? Language used to communicate the events of everyday life and to create intersubjective meaning around events related to the life of necessity. Hestian communication seeks to demystify masculist language and sometimes even to replace it so that abstract Hermean ideas, when appropriate, can be communicated to another audience. Hestian language is used to convey abstract Hermean knowledge to ordinary people. It is a kind of mediating language essential for meeting needs created by our human and collective existence. It is a common language essential for improving the quality of life for people in their daily existence. To understand a text, we must go beyond its surface or vocabulary levels. Words alone do not reveal an author's special insight which, we can assume, prompted or inspired the work in the first place. It is the author's viewpoint that gives a work unity. To understand an author's intention, the reader must also understand the mind and spirit behind the writing. Schleiermacher called the deeper, spiritual level of a work the "divinatory" or "psychological" level (Howard, 1982, p. 9). We must also consider this level in Catharine Beecher's Treatise if we are to understand her message for educators today.

I will now focus on Jane Roland Martin's conversation apropos Catharine Beecher. In Martin's view:

> A good conversation is neither a fight nor a contest. Circular in form, cooperative in manner, and constructive in intent, it is an interchange of ideas by those who see themselves not as adversaries but as human beings come together to talk and listen and learn from one another. (1985, p. 10)

In this spirit I offer a Hestian interpretation for Beecher's work as a prolegomenon in establishing a Hestian hermeneutic as a distinctive feature of research and theory in home economics.

Catharine Beecher: A Hestian Feminist

Catharine Beecher's Treatise on Domestic Economy has frequently been cited as the first textbook in home economics. It may well be the first modern text with a consciously Hestian purpose, that is, assembling and disseminating state-of-the-art knowledge necessary to act intelligently in the Hestian domain. Martin (1985) points out that it is a mistake to regard Beecher's Treatise simply as a description of domestic work. She says:

> In any society infants must be cared for, food must be prepared, clothing made, laundry washed, the sick nursed, gardens tended, houses cleaned. Beecher's case for her different-but-equal thesis does not rest, however, on this obvious point, but rather on her claim for the overriding significance of the educative function of women. (p. 123)

The acknowledgement of Hestian concerns as a legitimate focus for education is a major contribution of Martin's reclaimed conversation.

Martin describes Beecher's philosophy of female education as a mirror image of Plato's because, where Plato designed an education for his female guardians who were released from the Hestian obligation to home and children, Beecher's domestic education provided the reverse, a release from the Hermean obligation of citizenship. Now the argument against a position which denies women direct political participation holds up only if one uses a masculist lens of analysis built on dichotomous genderized values to press the point.

We must ask what the question would have been had women not already been presented with the received wisdom

of a patriarchal world designed for and dominated by males for their collective comfort and convenience, a world in which Hestian tasks (and those who perform them) are subordinated to Hermean tasks (and those who perform them).

In stating that "each individual of our race shall regard the happiness of others as of the same value as his own," (1841, p. 105), Beecher proscribes securing advantages for one class by sacrificing those of another to any institution in either private or public life. Beecher is challenging basic assumptions in political philosophy passed down since Plato's Athens. For Martin:

> A Treatise is a remarkable philosophical achievement. In making clear that women are to be as much their own legislators in domestic affairs as men in political matters, and that the domestic environment poses problems so difficult and challenging that both a liberal and a professional education are required for its practitioners, Beecher is able to conclude that women's tasks and functions ought to command the respect that men's do. (1985, p. 133)

By linking theoretical knowledge to practical judgment, Beecher demonstrates the positive value that Hestian activities represent in everyday life. Beecher's philosophy is internally consistent, and this consistency is even more evident when we apply a Hestian/Hermean hermeneutic to her two spheres model. A Hestian hermeneutic enables us to reclaim the underlying meaning of Beecher's text so that its relevance for contemporary educational, intellectual, and philosophical thought can be explored.

It is not enough to dismiss Beecher's work as promoting the cult of domesticity, unless we examine these words for their Hestian/Hermean implications. Beecher's failure to address the problem of educating husbands and fathers may be seen from a different perspective. By focusing on education for the Hestian domain, and conceptualizing this as a separate sphere, Beecher was prescribing a curriculum for a neglected area of human action. We may also assume that the capstone course in moral philosophy to which Victorian men were exposed in their collegiate education raised their consciousness of what it meant to be Christian husbands. The predatory and violent predispositions of males were softened and modified by the Victorian ideal of "gentle civility," the code of the gentleman, which contributed to reinforcing a stable role for men in the domestic sphere.

True, Beecher advocates a system of personal subordination within the Hestian sphere, but she sees this as a way to achieve social efficiency, that is, equilibrium between the Hestian and Hermean domains. This harmony of the spheres was a paramount value in her philosophy. In her view, Hestian subordination was a matter of choice in mid-19th century America because women who marry exercise the right to choose a husband, just as male members of a democracy have the right to choose their station in life, or vocation. Today we might ask what women and men need to know in order to make an informed choice in choosing to marry or in selecting a partner. Informed consent opens up the need for a considerable amount of knowledge. We must remember that Beecher was an early foe of unfreedom in the form of slavery (1837). She advocated the education of unmarried women to achieve independence through the Hestian profession of school teaching. If there was a "cult of true womanhood" characterized by piety, purity, submissiveness, and domesticity, we must see this as symmetrically related to the "code of the true gentleman" with its corresponding virtues of courtliness, protectiveness, responsibility, and honor. Through this ethical contract, equilibrium or balance between the Hestian and Hermean spheres could be maintained. This contract is implicit in Beecher's writings on domestic economy, that is, the economy and efficiency of labor and resource management in the Hestian sphere. Thus the symmetrical spheres of private and public life were to be maintained by mutually reinforcing codes of personal and public conduct. Beecher, we might say, was not rewriting the social contract of Rousseau so much as the marriage contract of Blackstone's Commentaries.

Motherhood involves the reproductive processes. But housewifery or homemaking is productive as well as reproductive. Beecher emphasizes the Hestian knowledge underlying the skills of motherhood and housewifery. Female-defined language for activities in the Hestian sphere needs to be developed and defined. To decode this dilemma, we must look past the Victorian language of the Treatise to the Hestian core of Beecher's concern. It is through Beecher's Hestian vision that she defined a new role for women in the household. To succeed, Hestian values needed to be reinforced in the Hermean sphere. That is, the social sanctions of the society were as important (perhaps even more so) than the existing legal sanctions. Her aim was the construction of a moral system rather than the deconstruction of a legal system.

Martin (1985) rightly points out that in Beecher's view the domestic environment is a domain not of mere skilled performance but of theory and practice joined together. By virtue of special education, as opposed to natural talent, the homemaker under Beecher's regime was to become a self-governing agent in Hestian (domestic) matters while the Hermean (public) world was to be under the control of men operating under the gentlemen's code which prohibits taking unfair advantage of the weak and powerless.

To apply a Hestian hermeneutic to Beecher's work allows us to reconstruct her intent. In the following passage (with gender changed) Howard says:

> After all, the author's vocabulary was a possession shared with her contemporaries. So was the wider 'vocabulary,' the scientific and cultural environment in which she lived. What is noteworthy about the author's work -- and the basis of its survival -- is what she does with this common possession, the insight she has into it and the fresh way she organizes it. It took a kind of 'divination' for the author to achieve this. It takes a corresponding kind of divination for the interpreter to appreciate it. (1982, p. 9; Gender references feminized)

Understanding a work both as a textual unity and as the unified expression of an organizing mind requires that, for a time, the reader become the same person as the author. To read Beecher this way, one must suspend her own modernity and travel back in time to enter the author's mind without the barrier of an alien language, that is, the Victorian woman's Hestian language. We sometimes find this easier to do when reading fiction than reading "old fashioned" didactic works which seem to lose their point because what was new knowledge then is old hat now. Therefore, to understand the Treatise "supposes a process whereby the total meaning of the insightful individual is linearized in common expressions and then recapturable by a different, perhaps very different, individual" (Howard, 1982, p. 10).

As Martin has shown, Beecher's message for us today is that daily life involves both reproductive and productive processes and that education must enable us to meet both demands intelligently and creatively. For home economics, the message is clear. The Hestian concerns of yesterday are the same as they are today. These are the perennial problems of everyday existence. By applying a Hestian hermeneutic to texts, we may be able to convey this message, and others like it, to a wider audience.

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The Female Researcher: Choice, Chance or Coincidence? The Case of Home Economics Education

Maureen E. Kelly

There is little doubt that home economics educators[1] associated with research oriented universities currently experience considerable pressure to conduct research. Two recent studies cause us to question how much these educators do publish, perhaps the most widely accepted indicator of research productivity. In 1982, Abdel-Ghany noted that home economics educators produced the lowest average number of published articles per year (.18) when compared with colleagues in other areas such as food and nutrition (.77) or child development (.75). Moreover, looking at the career productivity of 87 home economics educators, Hall and Wallace (1985) found that 39% had published no articles in the past three years with the mode for those who did publish during that time period (1982-1985) being one article.

In similar fashion, the home economics educators in the study reported in this article also showed low research productivity patterns. "Ah, ha!," one might say, "Overall, women are by nature more teaching oriented and men more research oriented!" Thus, one might speculate that the successful home economics education researcher would occur only by conscious choice of that individual or by pure chance.

Indeed, a popular explanation for women's lack of professional accomplishment was Matina Horner's concept (1972) of success avoidance. However, my interviews with 16 home economics educators located at six prominent universities lead me to reject that explanation for two reasons. Firstly, by saying that women have internalized the stereotype of success avoiders, we are implying that there is something wrong with women. Rather, as Sasson (1980) suggested, "...there is something wrong with this definition of success and that there is something right with women's inability to accommodate this definition" (p. 15).

Secondly, Fox (1985) points out about academic women that (1) "female faculty are constrained by the male culture that dominates academia;" (2) "normative standards of professional work create a bias in professional evaluation" that favors the white male and/or the solitary researcher; and (3) "women's disadvantaged status is perpetuated by the very sex segregation that is an index of their position" (p. 2). By keeping women in relatively isolated positions within departments or in colleges or schools of home economics, institutions actually make inequality less observable. This reduces the stress among colleagues at the institution but enables this systemic problem to continue "...without threatening academia's ideology of merit and objectivity" (p. 2). Thus, it comes as no surprise to us that the male oriented culture still dominates the system and the network of resources for research, professional opportunities, and services.

Ironically, Westkott (1979) indicated that such disassociation from the male mainstream emphasizes two components of women's consciousness. One aspect is that what women are concerned about can be seen as removed from the norm in a male dominated society. The other is that there is a "tension between consciousness and behavior" (p. 429). Recently, Carol Gilligan (1982) brought to the fore the idea that most women, by their socialization, are more relationship oriented than autonomous, single-minded individuals. They tend to view complex issues more broadly, being willing to acknowledge "grey areas" such as the issue of research versus teaching and service responsibilities. For the most part, it seems that women have rejected the positivist mode that tends to view people as objects in tightly controlled experiments rather than people with complex concerns. Thus, one could speculate that home economics educators, while knowing that research is the valued activity, may participate in teaching and service activities out of a sense of efficacy and justice rather than lack of research orientation or skill. Thus, research productivity in home economics education may be an event that occurs at the same time as other activities but more by coincidence than by chance or choice.

Now let me turn this discussion to the experience of the home economics educator at the research oriented university to discuss the question of female researchers -- by choice, chance or coincidence? Although the conforming behavior in a research oriented university is to put research and scholarship first, home economics educators seem to have chosen a different way of behaving, prefer-

[1] Home economics educators is used throughout this article to refer to home economists whose primary work is in teacher education programs.

ring to make people oriented activities, rather than research, their priority.

In an earlier study (Kelly, 1982), I identified the factors that enabled and inhibited high and low research producers in vocational education. In this paper, I use that study and the previously unreported interview data of 16 home economics educators to discuss at length the experience of female researchers.

The Sample

The data were obtained through a study designed to look at research productivity in the nation's leading vocational education programs at research universities. Therefore, faculty were drawn from universities who were members of the University Council for Vocational Education (UCVE), an organization whose expressed purpose is to promote graduate study in vocational education. In addition, the UCVE member institutions must have appeared on the Clark and Guba (1978) listing of the 24 highest producers of educational research and development or have been rated by Schubert (1979) as institutions having a high number of presentations at the American Educational Research Association (AERA) annual meetings during 1975-1978. Using these criteria, six universities were selected to participate in the study. Of the 17 home economics education faculty contacted, 16 agreed to be interviewed, providing a participation rate of approximately 94%. This subset of 16 home economics faculty members comprised approximately 18% of the total sample in the larger study of vocational educators.

The Research Design

The design of the study was a methodological mix of qualitative and quantitative strategies. A personal vita was obtained from each of the study participants before a personal interview was conducted. This enabled the interviewer to become familiar with the characteristics of the interviewee's research experience. A face-to-face interview in the interviewee's office was the means of gathering qualitative data, such as perceived writing competence, mentoring relationships. During the interview, a checklist served as a frame of reference for the interviewer at the beginning of each interview session and facilitated the gathering of baseline data, such as authorship while a graduate student, research assistance given by doctoral advisor, etc.

Data Analysis

In order to identify unusually high or low producing faculty members, a research productivity index was created. A Pearson product moment, inter-correlation matrix was derived for eleven variables speculated to contribute to research productivity. Eight were inter-correlated ($p < .05$) and used in the computation. They were lifetime number of: presentations, journal articles, books and monographs, popular articles, research reports, doctoral committees successfully chaired, doctoral committees successfully completed, and research grants obtained. Converting to z scores, these eight measures were added together and divided by years since the individual faculty member had received a doctorate (using 1982 as the correction factor) to form a corrected research productivity index (CRPI). Those with CRPI scores one standard deviation (6.42) above the mean (8.78) were categorized as high producers and those one standard deviation below the mean were categorized as low producers.

The interview transcripts from the resulting group of high and low producers and later, all home economics educators in the study, were subjected to content analysis. Following the method outlined by Berelson (1954), two major units of analysis were used: words and themes. Therefore, when specific words were used repeatedly in interviews, they were recorded and categorized accordingly. Similarly, when like propositions or themes emerged, such as, "heavy teaching load" or "teaching undergraduates is time consuming," they were grouped together.

The results are reported using an inductive analysis procedure described by Patton (1980) as logical analysis. This means that the investigator is looking for emergent patterns in the data, while seeking internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity. Internal homogeneity refers to the extent that the data hang together or dovetail in a meaningful way. External heterogeneity refers to the degree to which differences among categories are bold and clear (Guba, 1981).

Findings and Discussion

As stated earlier, 16 home economics educators participated in the study. In the vocational education study, there were 11 high research producers and 10 low research producers. One of the two female high research producers was a home economics educator, one less than would have been expected from their proportion in the sample. All four females who were classified as low research producers were home economics educators, far more than the proportion that they constituted in the sample. Looking at the corrected research productivity index by service area was more revealing. As Table 1 shows, compared to researchers from other service areas, home economics educators were on the low end on virtually every measure of research productivity.

Table 1

Research Productivity of Faculty Members by Vocational Education Service Area

Variable	Lifetime means by service area				
	Ag. (n=27)	H.Ec. (n=16)	BOE (n=13)	DE (n=8)	Voc.Ed.* (n=22)
Presentations	41.8	25.3	57.1	35.5	100.8
Journal articles	15.1	10.8	18.2	10.4	29.8
Books & monographs	3.9	1.8	4.4	4.6	9.8
Popular articles	4.3	1.6	5.6	1.9	3.4
Research reports	6.3	2.0	4.1	2.8	12.7
Doctoral committees chaired	8.0	2.8	8.8	6.5	12.5
Doctoral committees completed	21.1	7.1	15.9	18.6	35.0
Research grants	2.5	2.1	2.3	1.4	5.8
Years since doctorate	12.9	7.9	12.3	10.0	14.4
Corrected research productivity index	6.8	6.8	10.0	7.7	12.2

*Agriculture = AG, Home economics = H.Ec., Business Occupations Education = BOE, Distributive Education = DE, Vocational Education = Voc.Ed.

Further examination of the transcripts of these women reveals that most have not obtained much research money, a condition also reported by Hall and Wallace (1985). As one person put it, "Home Economics seems to be the poor stepchild when it comes to funding." Most found that the only way they could do research was to incorporate it into whatever curriculum projects were funded. However, this limited the "kinds of questions one can ask." As a result it was noted that most of the writing that home economics educators did was either curriculum work or conceptual pieces.

A dominant theme of the lower producer was identification with the research oriented, land grant university's other missions -- those of teaching and service. Home economics educators frequently talked about their "dedication to teaching," noting that they enjoy the "warm fuzzies" teaching provides. Thus, we might conclude that the home economics service area affiliation affects research productivity.

However, the history of research in home economics education mitigates against drawing this conclusion. First, there has been a reluctance to accept the role of homemaking as a legitimate occupation within the domain of vocational home economics (Hill, Shear, Bell, Cross, Carter, & Horning, 1979). Therefore, home economics educators have had to legitimize their roles as vocational educators prior to being considered for inclusion in vocational journals and programs at national meetings. As an example, Sharon Wallace and Helen Hall (1984) noted that publications by home economics educators in the Journal of Vocational Education Research (JVER) (reported here as a percent of the total volume) were 10% for the years of 1980 and 1981 and 6% for 1982. Although I have not seen a breakdown in membership for the American Vocational Education Research Association (the organization that publishes JVER), I suspect that this percentage is significantly less than the percentage of its' members who are home economists.

Second, the mean number of years the home economics educators in this study had held a doctorate was the lowest in the sample. Thus, it is likely that research in home economics education is just coming into its own. For, as Wallace and Hall stated, one of the shortcomings has been "A limited number of professionals involved in research activity on a continuing basis" (p. 415).

As alluded to earlier, women as a group were less likely to be high research producers than would be expected by their 26% representation in the sample. This difference in productivity is shown quite vividly in Table 2 where notable differences in output appear in nearly every category. Although females in the study had received their doctorates nearly eight years later than their male counterparts (home economics educators five years later), these differences cannot be accounted for solely on that basis.

Having chosen an academic career, most women appear to want to compete in academic circles and some already have competed successfully. However, since being a high research producer means making research a priority, we need to listen to these women's voices.

Overwhelmingly, there was a concern about the conflict between the responsibilities of teaching and the expectation of producing research. As one respondent put it, "Any relationship I have (with research) is because teaching is based on research." Another said, "Research is more useful if it can be used by clients. I'm terribly concerned with practical teaching...(I think) teacher educators have a responsibility to disseminate research information in a practical way."

As might be expected, lack of time to devote to research was a major inhibitor to its' production. People spoke of "the difficulty I have finding time to do research" and of "the large blocks of time that it takes to do research." In addition, home economics educators noted that they were assigned or elected to faculty committees, had extraordinary service responsibilities,

Table 2

Research Productivity of Faculty Members by Sex

Variable	Lifetime means by sex	
	Female (n=23)	Male (n=63)
Presentations	17.0	64.5
Journal articles	5.0	20.6
Books and monographs	1.9	6.3
Popular articles	1.3	4.5
Research reports	1.3	8.1
Doctoral committees chaired	1.1	9.9
Doctoral committees completed	4.6	24.9
Research Grants	1.0	3.5
Years with doctorate	5.3	13.1
Corrected research productivity index	7.3	9.3

Note: All figures were rounded to the first decimal place.

and heavy teaching and undergraduate advisement loads. Although most were aware of the effects such hectic and diverse schedules had on research and scholarly activity, few had taken steps to make such stresses known to administrators concerned about faculty productivity, nor were they refusing to take on additional tasks or responsibilities. Summarizing interviews with fifty academic women from diverse fields, Hackett and Mortensen (1985) stated that learning to say no without feeling guilty seems to be related to gender-role conflicts.

Moreover, home economics educators are concerned about their families and the community. As one respondent said, we "should take a look at the worthiness of service activities (as research productivity) in home economics. If we want to look at how productive research is, we should look at who uses it. For example, five to ten research articles take less time and have less impact than one (well grounded) curriculum guide." As another stated, "all that counts cannot be counted."

Another major source of stress was that women in this study viewed research as a solitary activity, and generally not their preferred mode of action. When requested to discuss what might enhance their research productivity, over half noted that having research colleagues would help. This was also true in the Hall and Wallace (1985) study where only 14% said that they preferred to conduct research alone.

It seems that a curious situation exists in home economics education. When younger women want research help, they look first to older, more experienced home economics colleagues for help. However, older faculty reported that they either didn't have or didn't feel the same pressure to do research when they were in earlier stages of their career, thus they lack the research experience or skills to assist their younger colleagues. Unfortunately, this lack of collegial assistance in conducting research is shared by other academic women. Hackett and Mortensen (1985) reported that "Lack of access to role models, mentors and informal collegial relationships puts women at a disadvantage, which is often acutely felt" (p. 13).

However, my data and that of Hall and Wallace (1985) lead me to believe that this situation is changing. Although the number of cases of highly productive women researchers were few (two) in this study, it was clear that those who were high producers have functioned in academic circles by following the rules of the principle players in the university game, productive male researchers. Productive women have had to be well prepared, assertive and ambitious. Moreover, such women know that their time is important to them and they protect it. On the other hand, they are flexible, sensitive people who are willing to work long hours and make intelligent trade-offs in their work. Although both high producing women in my study enjoy teaching, they have made research a priority in their lives. They have learned the rules through observation ("It was clear to me that if you do research, you can get promoted"), through mentoring by males ("I think it is important to keep up your contacts at other universities. I want people to know what I'm doing and to know where to contact me if they want to discuss an idea or do a joint research presentation. At the same time, I want to be able to help other women get ahead").

Implications

It is clear, then, that some home economists have become researchers by choice, largely by adhering to the rules and procedures set up by the principle players in the university game, white males. However, the perceptions and experiences of the 16 home economists in this study can be used as the basis for a broader research paradigm than that of the positivist model that has dominated the academy for so long. As researchers in the Winter, 1985, issue of the Journal of Vocational Home Economics Education so effectively reminded us, research in home economics must stretch beyond the empirical-analytical or positivist paradigm to have any real affect on teaching and family life.

As any home economist who is familiar with the history of our field can tell you, our foremothers had a broader vision of research in home economics than what we have yet to realize. Beginning with the training and development of individual educators, a concerted effort should be made to set up research mentoring programs in home economics education. This could include, but not be limited to, service as a graduate research associate on an actual research project, regularly scheduled researcher/graduate student seminars, or assignment to a research mentor early in one's graduate study with the expectation that at least one research project be conducted with that person before beginning dissertation work. A similar project could be conducted with young faculty, utilizing colleagues within and outside the education field.

At the same time, Nichols and Golden (1982) suggested that we might use the influence of those already in our network to help guide, interpret or serve as advocates for each other. Such horizontal networking would help to fill the gap left by the existing home economics mentoring structure, one that Marjorie Inana (1983) reported lacks "the ability to obtain grants and write and present papers" (p. 21). It is apparent to me that a nationwide effort to promote research networking among home economics educators and those conducting vocational education or teacher education research must be mounted. If we want to make research a desired choice in home economics, we must promote research productivity in new and different ways. The formation of groups like the Home Economics Research Special Interest Group (HERSIG) within AERA is encouraging, but only one step. In addition to the visibility and opportunity that such a group provides on the conference program, this allows opportunities for informal meetings among researchers at still another national meeting. Similar opportunities need to be provided at AHEA, AVERA, AVA, and HEEA meetings.

Finally, if research in home economics is to be seen as a viable choice, there ought to be more integration and use of research in undergraduate programs. Sawyers, Moran, Fo, and Milgram (1982) described how eight undergraduate and five graduate students participated in a faculty-student generated research project at Virginia Polytechnic and State University. Students contributed at all phases of the effort and several generated further research projects at the conclusion of the study.

It is essential to recognize the contributions and capabilities of home economics educators in research. WE hold the key to our success! By broadening the current research paradigm to include collaborative efforts and multiple approaches, we can make a giant step toward integrating the research process with the goals of teaching and family life that were envisioned by our foremothers.

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Isabel Bevier: A Different Voice for Women's Education in the Mid-West

Linda Peterat

> There will be, some day, an education for home-making and for woman's leading part in the finer forms of social intercourse, which will do on the higher plane what was done in a more petty way, generations ago, in popular finishing schools for girls. But this, too, is only a part. There is to be, further, a serious preparation for woman's part in the economic, the industrial, and even the political world. (Elmer Brown, United States Commissioner of Education, 1907, in Bevier, 1924, p. 103)

This statement often quoted by Isabel Bevier shows, she claimed, "clearly that women through education had entered into the larger life, the question of her [sic] path in it, however, was a difficult one yet to be worked out" (1935, p. 5).

* * *

In search of enlightenment on the status of women's education in mid-twentieth century America, feminists and educational historians have in recent years turned their attention and analyses to female educational reformers of a century ago. Frequently these studies have yielded portrayals of female educational reformers as social conservatives, described as maternal feminists, who fought to confine women through education to a limited role in the private/domestic sphere (Bacchi, 1983; Frankfort, 1977; Stamp, 1977).

Such a portrayal has been made of Isabel Bevier. Marjorie East (1980) chose the final words from Lita Bane's biography of Bevier to claim that despite Bevier's training as a chemist and her being an ardent proponent of rigorous scientific training in home economics, she still saw home economics as education of women for their homemaking role. East quotes Bane:

> I find my mind going back to the day when in 1912, as seniors at the University of Illinois, our class met with her for the last time, and we heard her say, "but the final aim is gracious womanhood." The closing bell rang, "Miss Bevier" rose from her desk, and the lecture on "aims of household science" ended. (Bane, 1955, p. 184)

In seeking explanations of the present, historical analysts too readily have focused only on those events or statements which can immediately illuminate the present (van Kirk, 1984). Or, they have chosen segments of the past, and sometimes out of context, in order to prove their view and analysis of the present. Such analyses have provided only a partial view of the educational vision and ideals of individuals from our past, and usually have not examined these ideals in the context of the times in which they were formulated and espoused. While such analyses have distorted our understanding of the past struggles of women, they have also served to divide women in the present struggle for liberation.

This paper turns to Isabel Bevier, a turn of the century founder and educator in home economics in the Mid-Western United States. It examines the educational vision and ideals of Isabel Bevier, primarily to restore her voice to the present educational debate. It will attempt to portray her philosophy as wholistically as possible, examining what was said, when, and to whom. In this way it will attempt to show history and philosophy as lived, contradictory and changing, neither static nor unidimensional. I will consider her philosophy in relation to its historical context and consider the meaning it may have for women's struggles for educational equity in the present.

In the first part of the paper, I examine the historical context of Bevier's ideals, an era which she describes as a "new beginning" marked by the spread of the land grant college and the welcoming of women to the field of science. The second part of the paper is a reflective analysis of Bevier's philosophy of education, a questioning of its meaning for present day struggles.

The New Beginning

Isabel Bevier was born in 1860, on a farm near Plymouth, Ohio. She was born into an era of new hope and new opportunities for women. Opportunities were expanding rapidly for women to pursue higher education. As Bevier stated "at this time, the women, too, marched in the procession" (1924, p. 87). Ohio led the way in co-education colleges with the opening of Oberlin in 1833. The Western universities rapidly moved to co-education. The state universities, notably Utah in 1850, Iowa in 1856, Washington, 1862, and Minnesota in 1868 permitted women to enter. In 1870, Michigan, Illinois, California, and Missouri opened their doors to women.

Bevier describes her own era in educational history as one of increasing aspirations and challenges to old forms:

> In that day (prior to 1900) the aristocratic idea of education prevailed, and a college education was still regarded as the privilege of the few. It was not for everyone; but for the lawyer, the doctor, the preacher, or the teacher; but there was a constantly increasing number of people, businessmen, industrialists, farmers, women, who did not belong to either of the classes mentioned above and who did wish an education adapted to their needs. (Bevier, 1924, p. 1)

Bevier believed that co-educational colleges were a progressive form of education for women. They were undoubtedly the setting in which she preferred to work.

> I had long before decided that I would not spend my years teaching in any woman's college, although I had learned much while living in them. But I had never been able to make them seem other than abnormal places of residence for me. My association with my father and three brothers as well as my training in coeducational colleges had made me entirely coeducational in all my sympathies. (Bevier, 1935, p. 15)

A co-educational university in which the educational needs of different groups of people would be addressed, such as the land grant college, was particularly appealing to Bevier. In her own interpretation of history she stated:

> It would appear that several points about woman's education were settled by 1865. First, that something more than morals and manners and genteel learning must be offered them. Second, that co-education was a safe experiment. Third, that the work at Mt. Holyoke had borne fruit and a real college for women (Vassar) was about to be opened. Fourth, the pioneer life had necessitated comradeship in work and made possible comradeship in education. It would appear that the time was ripe for a new instrument of education that should embody these ideals. (1920 address quoted in Bane, 1955, p. 137)

The Vision of the Land Grant College

Illinois Industrial University, now known as the University of Illinois, was founded in 1867. In 1874, four years after women were admitted to the University, the School of Domestic Science and Arts was established. Established on the initiative of the first Regent of the University, John Gregory, it was abolished under the second Regent Selim Peabody in 1881. In 1891, there was agitation from alumnae to revive the School of Domestic Science. In 1894, Andrew Draper assumed head of the University as President rather than Regent and on his invitation, Isabel Bevier came to the University of Illinois in 1900 to establish the Department of Household Science.

Bevier arrived at the University of Illinois, into a setting "literally buzzing with newness. New buildings, new courses, new members of the faculty...and a spirit of adventure, open-mindedness and experimentation prevailed" (Bevier, 1924, p. 13).

She was, by her own admission, new to the task at the University of Illinois. She had been, through her own education "associated with the aristocratic idea of education" (1924, p. 7). She was therefore, a convert to the idea of home economics or rather, a creator of a field, launching itself on a new course at the turn of the century. She had apparently clarified for herself some ideas on what this course would be, for she stated:

> These years had given me some rather definite ideas as to what I thought constituted a liberal education for women, and I was so pleased to find I was to have my chance to plan a course that would help me realize my ideal. (1935, p. 15)

Dean Davenport, reflecting on Bevier's arrival at the University of Illinois asked:

> What was it...that led or drove this farm girl along her zigzag course of preparation? Preparation for what? Nobody could have answered the question then, much less she herself. She worked with pioneers of science, not content to follow beaten trails along the margins of a goodly prospect, but intent upon exploration for themselves. (In Bane, 1957, p. 25)

The mission of the land grant college, as reflected in the motto of the University of Illinois, "learning and labor" was to serve industrial and agrarian interests, to reach to daily life, elevating its quality through scientific and intellectual approaches to its understanding. It was to encompass liberal and practical learning and carried a mandate of "the right of learning" for all (Treichler, Kramarae, & Stafford, 1985).

Bevier stated:

> Day by day I was acquiring the idea of what the land grant college meant in education, which was the idea that it belonged to all the people, that the state university was to serve the interest of the state, that what we found out in our laboratories if helpful were to be passed on.
>
> A responsibility was undertaken for interpreting the common life and the daily tasks on a

> scientific basis. So far as women's education was concerned just at that time this idea from the land grant colleges of working on a scientific basis was a very great contribution. The cooking schools with their rule of thumb methods could not get very far, but the scientific exploration for the action and reaction of heat, cold, acids, and alkalis opened up a whole new world in the then much discussed food question. (Bevier, 1924, p. 7)

Bevier was well aware of the newness and the experimental nature of the education in which she was involved. She stated:

> One can hardly overestimate the far reaching results on the land grant college in the development of education for the common life and the daily task. It was a new experiment in education. They expected to do the unusual and that idea was good for conservative women. (1935, p. 4)

> The question of the best type of education for women has been a perennial one in the field of education. The land grant colleges have chosen unanimously to put emphasis upon home economics as the best solution of the question. (1924, p. 237)

> There seems to be a consensus of opinion that home and child are ultimately the major interests of the great majority of women, and that somewhere in the field of education specific training ought to be provided to safeguard and develop the interests of both. (1924, p. 237)

The view of education for women as conceptualized by Bevier is evident in the early program of studies at the University of Illinois. Administratively, the new Department of Household Science was allied with the College of Agriculture, but the largest proportion of the students came from the College of Literature and Arts. It was possible to graduate from anyone of the three colleges -- Agriculture, Science, or Literature and Arts having specialized in household science. Courses which the Department of Household Science offered were those courses "which specially served the interest of women, and stand in university life for a recognition of the importance of adequate and proper training for home duties" (Proceedings, 1908, p. 43). Courses were intended to serve those students who while specializing in other work desired a knowledge of general principles and facts of household science, and those students who wished to make a speciality of household science together with study in arts and sciences. When the department opened in September 1900, there was an enrollment of twenty. The enrollment in September 1904 was two hundred and forty-five, forty of whom were men taking a course in Personal and Public Hygiene.

Through the developing School of Household Science at the land grant college, University of Illinois, Bevier viewed home economics as not <u>all</u> that education for women should be, but a <u>part of</u> liberal education for women, a part which should reflect the specific interests of women and be a part of education in general. The vision of the land grant college as a sort of "people's university" addressing the concerns of daily life and addressing interests of non-traditional college populations (industrial classes), was a fertile territory to develop this educational experiment. The land grant college with a policy of co-education was the setting. Science offered the invitation.

The Invitation of Science

From the 1830's onward in the United States, science was rapidly advancing. The practical and utilitarian sciences were exalted, while pure science was considered snobbish and anti-egalitarian (Solberg, 1967). Posing as a disinterested form of knowledge, science demonstrated it did not discriminate according to sex (Treichler, Kramarae, & Stafford, 1985). Science was a new frontier for women interested in advancing its applications to sanitation, nutrition, and digestion. Coming together with the populist notion of the land grant college, applied science gained widespread favor. By the turn of the century, the promise was for the betterment of life through scientific understanding of principles, causes and components of the daily life and environment. Bevier considered it essential that women's interests be linked with science in order to gain recognition and value. From an analysis of the forerunners of household science, she concluded:

> They lacked any adequate working basis; they failed as the Manual Labor Seminary failed because they were economically unsound, had no scientific basis, and no permanent educational value. Neither pious intentions nor fulsome oratory about the glories of motherhood nor rules for good housekeeping furnish an adequate working basis for a serious study of the home. (1924, p. 188)

The field of science in which women like Bevier entered and worked was a field dominated and controlled by men, as were the universities of the time. In creating the new department at the University of Illinois, she was surrounded by men in positions of control, and she sought and relied upon their advice. About choosing a name for the new department, she related:

> The naming of this new educational child was entrusted by President Draper to Dean Davenport, Vice President Burrill and me, and here Dean Davenport's guiding hand appeared. The three of us wanted science as the basis and the scientific approach to the subject, but it was Dean Davenport who said, "I believe there will be some day a science of the household. Let's get ready for it and develop it." So the child was named "Household Science" and thus due warning given that neither a cooking school nor a milliner's shop was being opened in the University. (1935, p. 17)

Dean Davenport described the naming of the department thusly:

> Professor Bevier...felt that the need of the times was for something which might be called "Applied Science for Women" but the demand was for instruction in homemaking, and the choosing of the term "Household Science" for the name of the department was, all things considered, entirely logical. (Bane, 1957, p. 337)

There is indication that Bevier may have fallen into a dutiful daughter role in relation to the males that dominated her work environment. She relates the following after her first meeting and drive through the countryside with President Draper: "President Draper and I soon found one common bond, possibly a surprising one, our love of fine horses. I felt almost as if I had been riding with my father" (1935, p. 14). In any case, she certainly relied on men's advice in her founding of the new department: "In my search for ideas and help I went naturally to the chemistry department first, because of my experience as a teacher of chemistry" (1935, p. 17).

In the expanding opportunity which science afforded women, there was also an expanding opportunity for men. Women, relegated to the applied and practical forms of science provided value, credibility, and students for the pure forms of science. This is evident in Bevier's description of the first course offered in the new Department of Household Science:

> In Household Science 2, as we called Home Architecture and Sanitation, Professor White taught home planning most skillfully. Other members of the engineering staff gave lectures on heating, plumbing and lighting, while Dean Ruker gave a course in the history of architecture and I supplied the woman's point of view about the home. (1935, p. 18)

The relegation of women to the applied fields and their inability to transform the traditional form of knowledge, was again something which Bevier appeared to recognize. Witness her response to a question at the Tenth Lake Placid Conference on Home Economics:

> Miss Kinne: The question that arises in my mind is one which I wish you would all help me to answer. Someone has defined science as the sifting of problems. If these problems are all solved, why shall we continue to have a separate subject of home economics? Why shall not the application of chemistry be taught in the chemical laboratory, and so on? That is the question I would like to have answered. It seems to me we are leaning that way. Instead of teaching abstract chemistry, we teach the applications of chemistry. We are coming to a time when home economics will be taught in every laboratory.
>
> Miss Bevier: We cannot have it done that way at the University of Illinois in pure science, because the men are unwilling. (Proceedings, 1908, p. 57)

Lita Bane, Bevier's biographer, writes that Bevier specifically spoke to her about the money she was bequeathing in her will to provide for a series of lectures on the philosophy of home economics. She specifically wanted to assure the money would be used for the purpose intended and not for other purposes which male faculty might determine. Bane wrote:

> She charged me to see to it that "the brethren," so she called them, used the money for home economics and not for some other cause they might think more worthy on this campus where men's interests, she believed, usually had first consideration. (Bane, 1957, p. 97-98)

Isabel Bevier died in 1942. In a life spanning eighty-two years, social conditions undoubtedly changed dramatically. One can expect that an educational philosophy spanning this lengthy lifetime would also change dramatically. The following section of this paper takes a more analytical look at Bevier's philosophy, focusing primarily on the time from 1900 onward while she was at the University of Illinois and later in her retirement years.

Revolutionary or Conservative?

A partial analysis of Isabel Bevier's philosophy of education may claim her as either revolutionary or conservative. She struggled to create a path and ground for women in higher education in a terrain which was male-dominated in all the realms she worked, the university, agriculture, the public schools. Hers was a struggle for differentiation in education, a different

educational path, not as the only form of education available for women, but a path that should represent women's interests. She believed that women had proven they could compete with men in the traditional male forms of knowledge, but that they had yet to gain control over their own education. She believed that a different kind of education was the next step in the evolution of the ideal of co-education.

Isabel Bevier clearly believed that the society in general and women in particular needed to value the work of the home. At a 1910 meeting of the American Home Economics Association, she called for "women whether in the school or in the home, (to) work together" (1911c, p. 1980). She believed that through valuing the activities of the home and improved understanding of the complex nature of the work, women could gain control over the conditions of their work.

> The study of Home Economics will show that much of what we are now pleased to call the drudgery may be borne by the family and that part of it will not be necessary, if we know well how to do it. We learn that a thing one can really do well loses its terror and then one is able to control the circumstances under which the work is to be done. (Bevier, 1911c, p. 181)

Bevier's fierce alliance with science as an essential basis for the new field of study of daily home life was tested in an incident of 1911. She described it as follows:

> Meanwhile, the age-old conflict between the cooking and sewing school adherents and those who believed in the scientific method of approach to the teaching of Household Science had gone on in the Farmer's Institute circle.
>
> This opposition found expression in a resolution by the household science department of the Farmer's Institute voicing its disapproval of the department. The final straw was my refusal to accept the proposition to work for an appropriation which the insurgents felt certain would be secured if I would agree to an advisory committee of their members to work with me for the department. Since those women and I had never spoken the same language and held such opposite ideas about the teaching of Household Science, I could not expect help from such a committee. (Bane, 1955, p. 53)

She steadfastly held to the belief that science should be the basis of study of the household. Her resignation was requested by the Dean over this incident. At the time she was on leave at Columbia University and refused to resign. She returned to the University several months later warmly received by colleagues.

One could fault Bevier for this splitting from women who were interested in other approaches for expressing their interests in education. She could be accused of furthering her own elitist educational ideals and of advancing a certain control over other women through knowledge. She showed impatience however with other professionals who she regarded as too removed from their own experiences and daily life. She stated:

> It seems to be reasonable to believe that many of these young women college graduates full of zeal to enter schools of philanthrophy, be dignified with the title of social workers, and have experiences in slums and dancehalls, would do much more effective service if they had served an apprenticeship as social workers within the circle of their own family, and so "tried out" some of their theories. (In Bane, 1955, p. 160)

At the same time, she displayed an openness to learn from her students. In her book, The House, she included several sections of advice on maintaining floors gleaned from her students' experience, and included students' responses to the question, "What suggestions have you to offer concerning household conveniences?"

Perhaps her most imaginative work was done in organizing Home Economics Extension at the University of Illinois. She stated:

> Little opportunity was given for them (the women) to take the initiative. Most of the plans were made and executed by men.
>
> Miss Bunch and I felt strongly that a special organization "manned" by women and managed by them might move more slowly but it would offer much better opportunity for women to state their plans and work for their women's meetings, and in so doing develop themselves. (Bevier, 1935, p. 5)

Bevier's early efforts were undoubtedly focused on enhancing the value and status of women's work in the domestic realm. Encouraging women to see the value of their work preceded her considerations of who actually should do this work. In both textbooks, The House and Planning of Meals, she wrote for women, using "she" on all occasions and not questioning these obligations of women. On one occasion, she left some doubt about the gender of the "purchaser" of the family food and stated, "The purchaser of the family food supply should be familiar with the general classes of food stuffs" (1914, p. 9). She continues beyond this statement in the text to write of "her."

While speaking to women and addressing her subject matter in textbooks to women, she excluded men. But this is not so when speaking in the general university

community. In an address to the Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities, 1906, she stated:

> The work is not limited by sex lines -- the facts of economics, science, and art are the same for men and women -- the application may or may not be the same. The home decorator may be either sex, but must know the principles of art. In these days a knowledge of dietetics is essential for the physician -- man or woman. Yet so long as the world is constituted [as it is] at present, the administrative side of the home is likely to be largely in the hands of women. It is said that 90% of money expended is expended by women or for women. Therefore the subject as a whole is of peculiar interest to women. (In Bane, 1955, p. 129)

In a letter to the editor of the Daily Illini, 1905, she argued for the importance of Household Science for all:

> As all human beings need air and water, food and shelter, it is quite desirable that all human beings should have some knowledge concerning these essentials, so courses in domestic architecture are of interest and value alike to men and women. It is quite desirable that both should understand the principles of construction, the requirements of good building, the principles of decoration. (In Bane, 1955, p. 116)

In a later address to a 1923 meeting of the American Country Life Association, Bevier stated her views on family life:

> Tradition and custom have long assigned to the mother the heavier responsibility for the upbringing of the family. Training for parenthood even now is usually interpreted in terms of the training for the woman rather than the man; for the mother, not the father. I am not pleading for the same kind of responsibility but that, in so far as possible, they shall share alike in the sense of responsibility. (In Bane, 1955, p. 152)

She specifically addressed the father's part in family life:

> What boy is trained for family life? The successive steps of adolescence and coming of age might be made sacred and beautiful portals to a new life if fathers and mothers worked to that end. The boy might be taught what the use and abuse of these new powers meant and how far reaching were the results in either case. For the adult man it seems to me the adjustment to the new order is even more difficult than for the woman. He has not had her training in adjustment, in diplomacy. From very early days woman has had long schooling in learning how to secure what she wished from her lord, master, husband. Power through money, politics he understands but this attitude of mind that the woman has equal right to self-development is as far as the poles from his daily thinking. (In Bane, 1955, p. 155)

In the same speech, she stated, "Comradeship in work, play, love, worship, property rights, and responsibilities of fathers and mothers is yet to be worked out before there can be any adequate conception of the mutual responsibility in family life" (In Bane, 1955, p. 152).

Bevier's concern for the lack of equality or "comradeship" as she called it in marriage and family was evident earlier in 1917 in an address to a small town audience in Illinois. The local newspaper reporter wrote of the event:

> One of the best things she said was that men thought women were unbusinesslike and did not know how to take care of money. But she said that it was because they were never told to spend wisely but always told they must save. She said she would like to have the pocketbook transferred to the women for one week and for that time the man should have full control of the butter and egg money to buy what he needed, and she would choose that time when the hens were moulting and the cows were dry. (In Bane, 1955, p. 109)

Bevier's vision for women in the society extended well beyond the domestic role. She spoke of the woman as citizen. In 1919 while women were gaining the right to vote in the United States, she wrote in an address:

> To me it means that this woman who has been for many years an honorable citizen is to have the legal right to be called by that name. We all understand that women who have been interested in their homes and community have been in a very real sense women citizens.
>
> The right of suffrage for which some women have fought for years is not to be lightly esteemed nor carelessly used. (In Bane, 1955, p. 163)

She continued:

> Surely we as women cannot feel that we have progressed very far so long as the woman's page in our public press consists only of recipes, directions for making beads, or designs for clothes that make caricatures of the human figure. Go home and get your local paper to omit the woman's column or at least put in it

one question of particular interest to the woman citizen. (In Bane, 1955, p. 164)

Isabel Bevier does not offer us a clear, unwavering philosophy of education, always understandable and uncontradictory. She spoke in different voices to different audiences, at different times. In 1912, amid arguments for the importance of home economics in the education of both men and women, she told her class of students when meeting for the last time that the "final aim" of home economics was "gracious womanhood" (Bane, 1955, p. 184). In 1925, at the same time that she recognized the lack of comradeship and mutual responsibility in home and family life, she wrote: "Women need...to remember it is their God-given business to mother the race. For this high and holy calling no courage is too great, no sacrifice too costly, no education too high" (In Bane, 1955, p. 101).

In later years, Bevier appeared to move beyond viewing science as the most important and only legitimate basis for home economics. Possibly influenced by the advances in the human sciences, she conveyed a broader vision for home economics:

> Man does not live by bread alone; economics cannot do everything. Spirit and life have their sources, too, and must be cherished.
>
> Home economics workers must not be so much occupied in the details of teaching food, clothing and shelter, that they forget that health, art, and beauty of life are included in their programs; that the finer forms of social intercourse, the development of gracious womanhood, have their place in home economics training. The public still recognizes the family as the unit and the home as the center and wants all that was best in the old forms of family life represented in the new. It should be enriched by the discoveries of science, the development of art, the right economic and social ideas, and it must be permeated by the spirit of service and loyalty. (Bevier, 1924, p. 181)

Concluding Comments

One central purpose of this research was to uncover and restore the voice of Isabel Bevier to the current educational debate. The approach was a wholistic and exploratory analysis. To ask was she for this or for that is the wrong question. If we interpret her work as successful or oppressive, we are likely to misinterpret women's history in education. She voiced many opinions. She thoughtfully and carefully attempted to read her times and to seize for women opportunities within the opening educational arena. Her struggle was political; her ideals expressed differently to different audiences.

Bevier brought to her work a keen sense of the evolution of ideas on women's education. Her work was part of the home economics "movement" (Bevier & Usher, 1906) which she viewed as a great "educational experiment." The new Department of Household Science at the University of Illinois was a "child." Her work in women's education was a beginning, a field of study taking form, becoming.

Bevier's voice was clearly a voice for a different form of education based on women's traditional interest in the home. Her goal was to bring value and thoughtfulness to the work of daily life so that women would both value themselves and be valued by the society. Her vision of an education based on the different interests of women was not intended to be the only education available for women. Within the social milieu of her time, women were advancing in many areas of higher education. Suffrage was being gained. There is no indication that Bevier opposed any of these options for women. She argued that education about and for daily living was also important for men and that both men and women should be educated for life in families. While it was not the central vision for which she labored, she recognized a dual need and vision for education to prepare men and women for domestic, daily life and for life in the public work realm. This voice for difference, however, was at the same time locking itself into the traditional, patriarchal educational structures and forms of higher education. We are reminded of Mary O'Brien's more recent comment on the irony of women struggling within educational institutions for reform while "Educational systems and school curricula are structured hierarchically and are profoundly conservative: educational institutions are bastions of male supremacy and ruling class power" (1983, p. 3).

And so, the voice for a dual vision, a voice which valued difference in education was narrowed to a mono-vision within the value and structural hierarchies of higher education. The struggle for the value of women and their work in society became a discipline furthering socialization to the status quo, rather than social transformation. The struggle and dialogue of the "great experiment" as lived by Bevier was drained of life and disembodied, transformed into dates and facts for succeeding generations of women scholars. Within the context of traditional pedagogy valuing pre-constructed knowledge, closures and summations, the multi-worded vision of education was on the last day of class reduced to "gracious womanhood." We can now ask, as we attempt to restore a full vision, the meaning of this gracious womanhood. Was this final plea for gracious womanhood a retracting and rejecting of other ideals in favor of only

one or was it a vision only dimly emerging,to ground knowledge on the difference of being a woman (Martel & Peterat, 1985)?

In home economics, Bevier and her colleagues of the time refused a total flight through education, from the concerns of their sisters. They sought to exploit the possibilities which higher education offered, to link the interests of the majority of women in home and daily life to the sciences. Psychologically, they were able to claim the interests of their mothers within the patriarchal structures of higher education controlled by their fathers (Peterat, 1983). Within the setting of the land grant college, Bevier focused her concerns on rural and farm life. She focused on the agrarian world in which she grew up and was comfortable; a world in which the comradeship in work was a natural basis for comradeship in education. Through the land grant college she could affiliate with the industrial and agrarian classes content that higher education was the path to the promises of a democratic nation. She could at the same time escape many of the issues of urban and industrial life which concerned some of her colleagues (for example, Talbot, 1936) in home economics.

With all the promise of newness and opportunity, the idea of an applied science challenged traditional knowledge forms and pedagogical relationships. New questions were asked of the scientific disciplines, classrooms were transformed into laboratories. Yet the social relations of knowledge were not transformed. Patriarchy enhanced its hold. Applied and practical science formed as derivative areas of study, as service forms of knowledge within higher education. Locked within the realm of discourse of the pure sciences, applied and practical sciences were cast as the inferior others against which superiority for the pure disciplines was claimed. The confines of Bevier's struggle -- home economics, land grant college -- all testify to the same inability to gain value on any grounds other than the traditional, elitist notion of education.

In recent years feminists have challenged the traditional content and structure of knowledge. By maintaining political and social networks and agendas, feminists have challenged many disciplines from within. Yet it remains a question as to whether these challenges have altered the core of any discipline; whether women and men have become "comrades" in knowledge construction? Such action has been positive for home economists for they are no longer reliant totally on patriarchal informed knowledge. The multiple vision for women which is awakening is also positive for the options offered for women and men. The challenge is to maintain many options, possibly through a dual identification with the main (male) stream of knowledge and with the uniqueness and difference of women, which home economics embodies. It is from within this tension of duality that we can grasp the possibility of new pedagogical relationships, institutional structures, and knowledge forms. In a small way, this study of Isabel Bevier has attempted to recover some sense of the history of women's education and to restore something of "the educational experiment" which women's education still is.

* * *

> There will be, some day, an education for home-making and for woman's leading part in the finer forms of social intercourse, which will do on the higher plane what was done in a more petty way, generations ago, in popular finishing schools for girls. But this, too, is only a part. There is to be, further, a serious preparation for woman's part in the economic, the industrial, and even the political world. (Elmer Brown, 1907, in Bevier, 1924, p. 103)

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Marjorie M. Brown: Initiating a Dialectic for Education and Everyday Life

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In her study of the history of educated women, Solomon (1985) reveals that over time, dialectical tensions have occurred between women's demands and their push for education, and the obstacles encountered. Oppositions have been such that "educated women have still not achieved equal status with men either within or outside the sphere of education" (p. xvii). The subject of women and their contributions has been excluded from or distorted in the disciplines, such as educational philosophy, history, psychology, and literature, according to Martin (1985). Not only have the views of women been neglected, but that portion of society concerned with the world of the female has been denigrated. Martin says, "Discussion about marriage, home, family are missing as are discussions about society's reproductive processes" which include activities such as, "the rearing of children" and "taking care of family needs," and "running a household" (p. 6).

Contributions of the field of home economics and of home economists have also been omitted or distorted. Many home economists have sought to be heard on societal and other issues concerning the home and family. The voices, along with the substance, are often overlooked in many institutional and practical settings. Do people outside of the field know what home economics is all about? Have home economists been permitted to tell their own story or to enter a conversation in which they have expertise about the issues for discussion?

Marjorie M. Brown, a home economist, woman educator, and scholar is a potential contender for an academic debate about the nature of home economics as a profession (Plihal, Strom & Williams, 1985). She has recently completed a portion of a historical and philosophical study of the field (Brown, 1985). Her intent in this inquiry is twofold. The first purpose is to provide a medium to further stimulate discussion among home economists about critical issues in the field. By virtue of the particular focus presented in her work, Brown lays claim to a place in the conversation among academic disciplines about the home and family as the central concern for a field of intellectual and professional inquiry. To claim a place in (rather than enter in) the conversation is to demand recognition, to claim the right to speak about those things and conditions within the home and family which have consequences for the development of self-forming persons.

Brown's second purpose, to advance "the dialectical process of critical understanding of home economics" (1985, p. xvii), precipitated our interest in the nature of dialectic and how it proceeds. An understanding of the dialectical mode of inquiry is required for home economists to enter into discussions about the field. As researchers, we took the opportunity to become part of the dialectic-in-process as well as observe the ongoing dialogue. We hope to enlighten our readers about home economics and the process of dialectic, as well as engage with them in the give and take of dialogue.

We chose the Home Economics Defined Conferences as the setting to observe a dialectic-in-process. These conferences took place in 1979 in five different geographic locations. In each place, the procedure was the same. Brown and Paolucci (1979) presented a position paper, Home Economics - A Definition. Several groups of people at the conferences were respondents. First, there were two philosophers who reflected on the tasks involved in defining a field of study. A second group was home economics colleagues, current and retired administrators and professors from the home economics specializations. A more general audience of respondents representing every area of specialization and academic professional levels comprised the third group. The diverse participants at each of the conferences were expected to enlarge upon the ideas, and as Strom (1981) states, "clarify meanings expressed in the earlier presentations and to draw implications for their own areas of practice" (p. viii).

The purpose of this paper is to examine the position papers from these Conferences for the nature of the dialogue beginning at these Conferences and continuing into the wider intellectual community. Significant ideas from the Brown and Paolucci (1979) discourse on home economics will be presented first. This provides a framework within which colleagues' and other participants' responses as part of the give-and-take of conversation may be examined. Aware that the dialogue has continued beyond the conferences, selected written materials will be further examined for their support, extension, or opposition to the ideas presented in the debate. Written materials pertinent to the discussion have been provided by persons both within and outside of home economics.

By gaining perspective on this debate, how it occurred, and the points of agreement or disagreement, we gain a more comprehensive picture of the network of ideas about home economics. Those crucial elements or issues which support or negate the claims of home economists to enter conversations and debates in the broader intellectual academic community will also be identified. Through this analysis, the contributions of Brown and Paolucci as women educators, researchers, and philosophers in an educational field are highlighted.

There are three main sections to the paper. In the following section, the nature of dialectic as a mode of inquiry in general and, more specifically, with respect to home economics, is presented. The call by Brown and Paolucci to colleagues to engage in critical examination of the field, hence, dialectical understanding of home economics in its educative role and in its concern for the problems of everyday life, completes the first section.

Next, the analysis of the dialectic-in-process at the Conferences is presented. This involves setting forth the main ideas of the Brown and Paolucci definition and highlighting the responses to the dialogue in terms of the dialectic process.

Finally, the paper concludes with a brief description of the nature of the continuing dialogue. The post-Conference dialogues both extend and negate the meaning of home economics.

The Nature of Dialectic

Dialectic, in everyday language, refers to the theory and method of intellectual investigation to arrive at truth. Debate or discussion of contradictory or juxtaposed positions about a topic occurs in the dialectic mode of inquiry. In other words, a dialogue proceeds within a dialectic and both may be characterized by the process of reasoning used. Wheelwright (1960) identifies dialectic as one among several philosophical methods which seeks "to discover truth through the give-and-take of conversation..." (p. 478). He suggests that an open and critical inquiry into the general character of a realm of discourse and the relations between and among the essential elements of that realm proceeds mainly through dialectic. He specifies several questions which a dialectic might seek to resolve:

> How are the various fields of human interest and investigation related to one another? What are the basic terms, or concepts, which each employs, and how are they related to those employed in other fields? What presuppositions, or postulates, are made in each field as an indispensable condition of getting any investigations under way in that field, and how are the presuppositions made in one field related to those made in another? (p. 17)

Evidence of the occurrence of a dialectic or a dialogue within a dialectic may be found in many disciplines (Bernstein, 1976; Rossi, 1983; Rychlak, 1976). For example, in an examination of the history of dialectic thought across different political and cultural periods, Levine (1984) sought to discover the original meaning of dialectic in the thought of Karl Marx, and to assess the ways in which the response and communication of others about Marx's views are consciously or unconsciously distorted.

Communication and response by others to a person's views within a dialectic employs a dialogical principle. Howe (1963) says that the principle of dialogue involves openness to the other side, with a willingness to both speak and respond to what is heard and said. Employing this principle means becoming involved in correlative "thinking that looks for reciprocal relations between things, between persons, between meanings and truth, between theory and practice, between little meanings and ultimate meanings" (p. 42).

The value of employing a dialectic and engaging in the process has been expressed by Warren (1984) for political science and inquiry. He does not envision the introduction of dialectic theory and method into a discipline as replacing current modes of political inquiry, but argues that this philosophical method, if adopted,

> can condition, shape, and enrich our view of the domain, method, and spirit of political inquiry, and it can alter our general way of pursuing political study in terms of the assumptions and conclusions, means and ends, of our research. (p. 189)

Informed by the dialectical method, among other things, one would (1) become self-reflective and self-critical, hence, gain a spirit of openness rather than closedness, (2) move beyond mere linear causal explanations of human actions, (3) become oriented to the history and future of a field through critical reflection, and (4) focus on the wholeness of the field with respect to (a) its philosophical grounding in dimensions of the concrete, everyday life and to (b) the epistemological interrelatedness of its theoretical formulations, methodological orientations, and praxis. It means examining a position "with full integrity...understanding it on its own terms, and probing it to locate its weaknesses and internal conflict" (Bernstein, 1976, p. xix). The resulting self-consciousness and self-understanding leads to a more adequate comprehension of the realm of discourse under examination.

To think critically is to practice philosophy, according to Wheelwright (1960). One may be critical

about meanings, beliefs and practices. Concerning meanings, he refers to clarity in the organization and expression of ideas. To be critical about beliefs is to comprehend the grounds on which the ideas rest. As mentioned earlier in the paper, the way in which critical reflection proceeds, if open as opposed to dogmatic or closed, is through the method of dialectic. Brown describes this mode of inquiry and its use in home economics. She says:

> It makes free use of analogy and proceeds by reasoning from familiar and generally accepted ideas. The logic involved is not a formal logic ...but is the logic involved in seeking understanding through dialogue. To use dialectic as the mode of inquiry into the conceptual meaning ...we are using a mentally active procedure, rather than an inert one of merely taking in information. Dialectic does not have a series of steps or a prescribed procedure to follow. It does not follow a formula nor does it seek to capture truth in a formula. (1980, p. 11)

The process is one in which participants actively engage in the process of reasoning through debate. Each person involved seeks to comprehend the ideas presented, to agree as well as disagree with them. Brown continues:

> We become self-critical realizing that justification of our beliefs rests in their rational compelling nature in light of their underlying reasons. Consensus becomes the basis upon which our reasoned beliefs about home economics become acceptable. Consensus requires common understanding of what is meant as well as agreement that what is meant is intellectually and normatively acceptable. (1980, p. 12)

The dialectical method has three characteristics which Wheelwright (1960) describes. In the first phase, to think dialectically, is to examine different meanings or ideas with the intent of discovering an underlying common meaning. Brown says that in this phase conceptual categories are created, a quality which both home economics and home economics education are to have if either is to be considered a "learned field of study" (1980, p. 12).

A second quality which dialectical reasoning exhibits is the discovery of distinctions among apparently similar ideas. Explicating significant differences means being discerning and making relevant discriminations. Brown provides an example:

> Social studies and home economics education may be examined to distinguish between them when they are often considered to have the same interest in study of the family. (1980, p. 12)

The third phase of dialectical reasoning is "contextual amplification" (Wheelwright, 1960). It involves seeing things in their wholeness, seeing parts in relation to the whole. In this aspect, Brown says, "the effort is to construct a logically coherent system of ideas" (1980, p. 12). The movements of thought by which the building of this network of ideas takes place is through "intellectual consistency" and "vital consistency" (Wheelwright, 1960). The law of logical consistency or noncontradiction is the principle involved in the first of these, the development of a coherent, logical, necessary system of ideas in which every element of the experience can be interpreted. The second of these traits involves the law of the consistency of beliefs held with one's program of action. "It is to look for consistency in the larger conceptual context or between the conceptual system and life..." (Brown, 1980, p. 13).

A Call for Dialectic

After describing the nature of the task to be undertaken in Home Economics: A Definition, Brown and Paolucci (1979) invite their colleagues to engage in critical understanding of their beliefs and actions as professionals and the meaning and more general concerns of their field of study. This is one of many times that Brown engages in critical reflection, the use of the dialectic mode of inquiry and dialogue with her colleagues (for example, 1980; 1984; 1985).

The spirit of a collegial involvement is one in which participants develop a certain frame of mind and bring a set of attitudes to the particular encounter. According to Garman, collegiality is "the mental baggage persons bring with them as they work together" (1982, p. 38). Among types of persons who heighten a sense of collegiality are those whom she refers to as "organic members." About her own participation, she says:

> As the organic member I'm aware of the individual and the collective possibilities when members are involved in the flow of common experience toward common goals. As a member of an organic unit I am active and reactive, inductive and productive during the life of the experience... I'm able to see that much of the activity and the results of the involvement will unfold in a manner that will lead to new and unpredictable states. (p. 42)

It is in this collegial sense that Brown and Paolucci think about the kind of intellectual and social environment which can be created and the quality of that encounter as organic members when they say:

> We feel free, on rational grounds, to dissent...

> We bear responsibility for our own choices of beliefs, of attitudes, of action...
> We engage in criticism as legitimate approvals and rejections...
> We are what we make of ourselves and
> We mold our future by our action. (1979, p. 5; emphasis added)

Brown and Paolucci seek to engage colleagues in exploring the meaning of home economics by looking at the wholeness of the field, including its educative role and its more general concerns of the everyday life problems which families and their members primarily encounter within the home. Prior to the analysis of a dialectic-in-process, the concepts of education and of everyday life with respect to home economics need clarification.

Education and Everyday Life

Education. The concept of education may be used to designate a particular profession and the kind of processes or activities in which educators as leaders are engaged with students in the development of educated persons. Both home economics and education have been assessed and contrasted by Brown (1980) as action-oriented professional fields. According to her, both may be distinguished by their particular orientation to the clientele served. She characterizes them as having a personal service orientation, as opposed to a non-personal service orientation, such as in engineering. The personal service professions seek to effect change in the interests of the persons served and the larger society of which those persons are a part. Brown continues:

> With education and with home economics, the task is one of bringing about changes in...the way the client thinks, changes in the system of concepts which he/she uses in interpreting and acting upon the self and the environment. (p. 20)

Recognizing that the person served is capable of actively comprehending, reflecting, and transforming the activities in which he or she is involved, solutions to particular problems "are sought by communicative dialogue between professional and client in which each is expected to search and reflect critically" (p. 21).

The model proposed by Brown (1980) for home economics is an educative one with respect to both those we serve as professionals and the fund of knowledge we create for professional practice. Fay (1977) describes this model. He says that helping people to understand themselves and helping them to change the basic self understanding is a first step in altering negative interaction patterns which characterize other social life. About the body of knowledge which professionals need, he says:

> Theoretical knowledge is useful to the extent that it informs people what their needs are and how a particular way of living is frustrating those needs, thereby causing them to suffer; the goal is to enlighten people about how they can change their lives so that, having arrived at a new self-understanding, they may reduce their suffering by creating another way of life that is more fulfilling. (p. 204)

Everyday life. The concept of everyday life as a way of increasing our understanding of the human condition has emerged in diverse disciplines. Williams (1984) notes its conceptualization in philosophy and the social sciences as a way of thinking about the concrete, the practical. In elaborating upon the everyday obvious world largely ignored by scientific approaches, she quotes from Weigert:

> Everyday life is a general term which indicates the rules, experiences, actions and ideas which are taken to be real and are routinely acted out by members of society. It provides knowledge-in-use which enables humans to live together and to make sense of their lives. (p. 217)

Winter (1966) assumes that every science, ideology, and ethic of man must come to terms with the everyday world: "the practical world of doing within which truth is to be sought -- the reality which thought seeks to clarify" (p. 57). Elaborating further, he describes the everyday world as the arena in which day-to-day, taken-for-granted affairs are encountered and in which practical interests dominate our lives. It is a world in reciprocal relations with a person and from which theory emerges to enlighten the meanings given in the "lived" world.

For Heller (1984), everyday life is an abstract concept. It is a phenomenon existing in every society and which every individual has regardless of status. Similar to Winter, Heller thinks that everyday life is to be concerned with the reciprocal reproductive relationships between man and society. She says:

> If individuals are to reproduce society, they must reproduce themselves as individuals. We may define 'everyday life' as the aggregate of those individual reproduction factors, which pari passu make social reproduction possible. (p. 3)

Everyday life activities have been further elaborated by de Certeau (1983). Included are the common practices which we all do -- sleeping, eating, cooking, walking, dwelling, in addition to reproducing our own kind, those activities which sustain man or woman as a natural being. de Certeau's intent in popular culture studies is to explicate those everyday practices as forms and systems of production which may be hidden within or accompany other

more obvious forms of production. A focus on the ways of doing everyday life activities needs varying perspectives, theories, and methods if scientists are to penetrate the obscurity of the practices but not necessarily the persons as the originators of these practices.

The things, the artifacts or material or cultural objects of everyday life, such as clothing, textile structures, household furnishings, housing, pots and pans, foodstuffs, and so on, are elements of study for folk life investigations. Objects are studied in order to contribute to understanding human life, society, and culture. With all the attempts to comprehend the meanings of objects in everyday life, Ames suggests that scientists interested in artifactual research "have not been particularly interested in identifying or understanding the most fundamental relationships between people and objects" (1985, p. 105). If this interest arises, he believes that a different set of questions and strategies will emerge which will reshape the field of study.

The everyday life concept in home economics does not negate the work-a-day world but chooses to focus on those aspects of significance within the home and family. Such a focus has long been a part of the field of home economics (Williams, 1984). As Brown says:

> Throughout the history of our field, home economists have indicated a concern for people and their everyday lives and have recognized that relationships exist among the home and society and the development of individuals. (1985, p. 82)

Brown and Paolucci (1979) voice concern about the consequences of rapid social change and advancing technology in alienating human beings from their daily environments and the sense of control over the decisions affecting their lives. Thus understanding the everyday practices in the home and family in which the human mind is nurtured along with concern for the human significance of the objects of everyday life are important considerations for Brown and Paolucci in their examination of the social need to be addressed in home economics.

Understanding the meaning of these concepts is merely scratching the surface of the complexity of home economics as conceptualized by Brown and Paolucci (1979) and Brown (1985). We turn now to an analysis of the papers as dialogue at the Home Economics Defined Conferences.

A Dialogue Within the Dialectic

The Dialogue Begins

Brown and Paolucci initiate the dialogue by describing what the task of defining a field of study entails and how important definition is for members of the particular field as well as other members in the academic community. Defining a field of study engages one in philosophical thinking about the complexity of meaning which the concept of that field as a whole entails. It means engaging in a process of reasoning and developing a chain of thought in which ideas are consciously interrelated as one seeks to specify the intellectual and ethical bases of that field. With respect to questions such as "What is home economics?" or "What is the meaning of home economics?", to unfold meaning, Brown and Paolucci say:

> It is necessary to consider it as a field of study and, therefore, to 'peel off' layers of meaning which are common to fields of study and those which distinguish among them. (1979, p. 2)

Engaging in the process of defining a field of study such as home economics not only provides a basis for illuminating issues central and critical to its growth and the professional service it provides, but, they continue:

> The intellectual integrity of the field becomes open to question. Intellectual and ethical integrity are ultimately prerequisites for membership in the academic community of scholars essential to the preparation and development of professionals. (p. 4)

Turning to the process of defining home economics, the first layer of meaning to be "peeled off" by Brown and Paolucci is concerned with home economics as a profession, a belief which home economists have articulated since conceptualizing the field prior to the turn of this century. Using criteria developed in studies in the sociology of professions, the nature of home economics as a profession is distinguished from those fields and occupations which are non-professional in nature. One main requirement for a professional field is an explication of the social need or mission it seeks to address.

The second layer of meaning to be examined is concerned with home economics as a practical science. Within this conception, the practical nature of the profession, the body of knowledge created, and the methods of inquiry by which that knowledge is developed are considered. As Brown and Paolucci say:

> Unfolding the meaning of home economics as a practical science should make clear its intellectual complexity and the demands such a <u>hybrid</u> science places on those who seek to practice it through scholarly service. (1979, p. 11)

Their purpose is to provide evidence of a needed profession with a defined mission around which sub-areas or specializations (1) create knowledge, (2) seek to solve different practical problems, and (3) provide different professional services -- all of which contribute to and

are articulated with respect to the aim or purpose of the field. Thus, a consideration of home economics as a practical science becomes the premise from which critical examination of the field begins and the definition unfolds.

Two major ideas emerge from the deliberations and articulations of Brown and Paolucci. The first of these is: home economics has a defined social end or mission, which is limited in scope. Limitations are required in order that professional service may be provided for a particular area of societal needs or problems. The social need which home economists address has evolved historically from ideas and ideals expressed by early home economists. Further elaboration of the meaning of these ideas in the context of the developing social sciences is explained by Brown and Paolucci. They say:

> It was the social need for providing self-formative processes of the self and of society free of ignorance, blind compulsion, and unnecessary forms of social domination which was the concern of early home economists. That they chose to focus their services and their arena of study on the home and family was due to their conviction that the home and family is the primary social institution in the formation of the self and, therefore, of participation in the formation of society. (1979, p. 17)

The nature and function of the home and family as environments in which the individual develops leads Brown and Paolucci to reflect upon the nature of human action and those systems of action within the family conducive to the development of self-forming persons. From these reflections emerges a statement of mission for home economics as the next link in their chain of reasoning:

> The mission of home economics is to enable families, both as individual units and generally as a social institution, to build and maintain systems of action which lead (1) to maturing in individual self-formation and (2) to enlightened, cooperative participation in the critique and formulation of sound goals and means for accomplishing them. (1979, p. 23)

Next, the nature of professional service is examined by (1) considering the characteristics of practical problems and of practical reasoning, (2) reflecting upon the problem areas which should be addressed by the profession and their significance for the home and family, and (3) thinking about the processural problems related to what professionals do and say to help provide service to families and individuals.

The second major idea which emerges from the Brown and Paolucci deliberations may be stated as follows: the knowledge created in home economics, with its emphasis on practical problems, requires a comprehensive theory of knowledge which interrelates theoretical and practical knowledge. This interrelationship is necessary in order to carry out the mission of the field and to select modes of inquiry for creating knowledge relevant to that purpose. Brown and Paolucci enlarge upon these ideas. A conceptual framework is then proposed for the field. Concepts, relevant to the field, and their meanings are examined. They believe that more than one mode of inquiry is necessary to create knowledge about home economics as a practical science. One of these is philosophical, concerned with the analysis of concepts and the critique of normative positions taken in the interpretation of human action and the consequences of that action. The cultural hermeneutic disciplines provide a second mode of inquiry for understanding (1) the life world or social world of individuals and groups in different cultural settings, and (2) an interpretation of meanings implicit in historical, conventional, and contemporary forms of communication. Though less adequate than the others, the third mode of inquiry to create knowledge in home economics would be analytic-empirical. About this perspective, Brown and Paolucci say:

> (It) is used in order to predict the consequences, to some degree, by choosing the act which will provide the most desirable consequences, immediate and secondary. (p. 57)

About its usefulness, they continue:

> What analytic-empiricists do not recognize is that their conceptualization of science constitutes idealizations of what knowledge is, of what humans will do or can do given such knowledge.... It does not help in the conscious formulation of concrete goals defensible as valued ends. It provides no theoretical knowledge useful in understanding the context of a practical problem. Nor does it help in the judgment among alternative means available. (p. 43)

Following the elaboration on the appropriateness of different metascientific approaches to creating knowledge for home economics, Brown and Paolucci develop several models for the field in which substantive concepts and their interrelations are depicted.

In summary, Brown and Paolucci provide a preliminary perspective on home economics as a professional field of study. Within the context of their conceptualization, (1) the social need to be addressed through its mission, (2) the nature of professional service and the kinds of problems to be considered, (3) the kinds of knowledge appropriate to the field, and (4) the modes of inquiry needed to create that knowledge -- all are viewed in their interrelatedness to each other and the field as a whole. Though briefly considered, the historical and philosophi-

cal grounds on which the field rests are amplified. Given their articulation, we turn now to the other side of the conversation. Only a few examples may be considered.

The Dialogic Response

There were many expressions from respondents concerning the nature of the task involved in defining a field of study. The act of defining was the first consideration. It was characterized as difficult, thought-provoking, and reflective. For some, it provided a comprehensive and integrated view; others saw its evolution from the earlier history of home economics. Peterson (1979) says that defining a field of study is arduous and it raises hard questions about the field. He suggests that an additional component of a definition should be emphasized, even though he believes Brown and Paolucci are cognizant of it. Peterson says:

> (It) is not enough to state goals for a profession, but these must be stated concretely (in the dialectical sense) in their relation to existing conditions. This requires...consideration of the social context of the profession... the internal state of the profession, the functions it actually performs today, the relations to other institutions it maintains, the conflict and dilemmas resulting from these relations.... (p. 89)

The grounds for formulating a definition on the controversial philosophy and ideas of Jurgen Habermas were examined by Peterson and Kockelmans. Peterson (1979) believes that Habermas' views, which have been formulated in the context of debates in the social sciences, must be taken as problematic. He says these views "are not the result of reflection on sciences that are well organized and functioning with the general acceptance of a scientific community..." (p. 85). On the other hand, Kockelmans (1979) says: "Habermas has been able to show us a way in which we can discuss social, political and moral issues..." (p. 108). Both philosophers expand upon and seek consensus about some of the ideas and meanings presented by Brown and Paolucci.

Among home economics administrators, the definition makes more difficult the problems they face in interpreting the meaning of home economics to other university administrators and to the public (Lee, 1979; Magrabi, 1979; Rankin, 1979, p. 205). What is needed by some is a short definition (Rankin, 1979). Others continue to hold to a definition already in use, either individually created (Spitze, 1979, p. 201), or one which has long served the needs of the field -- that of Ellen H. Richards (Magrabi, 1979). Clapp (1979) believes there are other definitions which can be used rather than the one provided by Brown and Paolucci. Still others indicate that the definition provided is elusive and not in the form in which definitions are usually stated.

Many other respondents raised questions concerning how these ideas can be implemented into courses and curricula and the new kind of professionals which will emerge. According to Rideout (1979), the ideas, if implemented, might be possible for inclusion in a core curriculum and perhaps for the expansion of content of professional courses (Bubolz, 1979; Murphy, 1979). Cross (1979) and Ezell (1979) believe that the definition brings philosophy into consideration as a mode of inquiry appropriate to the field. Two respondents sought to elaborate and extend the nature and meaning of significant concepts identified by Brown and Paolucci. Bivens (1979) extends the concepts of family and family process, and Murphy (1979) further explores the nature of self-formation. Spitze (1979) provides additional concepts to be elaborated within the home economics framework.

Two respondents remarked about the difficulty encountered in comprehending the meaning of the definition. Any obstacles to conveying meaning make communication more difficult. Howe (1963) identifies several barriers. One is the language used and the understanding and meaning conveyed through the use of that language. One of the respondents says:

> In preparing my comments as one of the "reactors" for this session...I must admit that there is still much for me to yet fully understand in the Brown and Paolucci paper, and each time I read it my comprehension increases. (Crabtree, 1979, p. 125)

And East says:

> After years of serious attention to the meaning of home economics, I was not prepared to find myself so unable to find meaning here. The sentences were clear enough, but they led me away from meanings I had, into...unmarked trails. (1979, p. 136)

Another barrier to communication is ignorance of the subject matter of the field. Both philosophers expressed this inadequacy. Peterson says:

> I should begin by emphasizing the limitations my background imposes on me in discussing Home Economics...It is true...that I grew up in a family setting, lived in a home, and have even done some reading on these subjects. But the home economics profession has seemed remote from my interests.... (p. 63)

And Kockelmans, who is a philosopher by profession, indicates that he "cannot claim to have a sophisticated knowledge of home economics and its problems" (p. 91). However, their lack of knowledge of home economics did not

prevent them from engaging in dialogue with Brown and Paolucci.

Although some difficulties were encountered in the conversation at the 1979 Conferences, participants concerned themselves more with the nature of the definition and the defining process. Some questions were raised about the philosophical grounds underlying the definition. Many issues centered around the implementation of the Brown and Paolucci definition of home economics in academic settings.

Conclusions and Discussion

In a dialogue, all parties must engage in the give and take of conversation. Difficulties may be encountered in the art of dialectic. Not all participants comprehend the participatory role of a dialoguer as opposed to that of a mere "reactor," that is, one who engages in opposite action without entering into the full meaning and quality of dialogic response. Many of the participants at the Home Economics Defined Conferences saw themselves in the role of reactor, although Brown and Paolucci seemed to expect something different in their call to a reflective examination of the field.

The grounds on which the ideas rest and the interrelatedness of the conceptual orientation, the methodologies, and the praxis seemed to be neither fully comprehended nor examined by the respondents and other participants. To engage in dialogue within the dialectic does require understanding of the process as well as the skill. Consensus about the meaning of home economics did not occur. However the dialogue continues.

Brown considers "any article, any monograph, any book -- as one part of the whole dialectic process" (1980, p. 63). A continuation of the dialogue not only elaborates and extends the ideas presented at the 1979 Conferences, but sometimes ideas of a different sort emerge which lessen the possibility for debate to take place.

Several home economists continue to engage in conversation with Brown and Paolucci. Further examination has taken place of the modes of inquiry needed in home economics and home economics education and their application in the field generally (Coomer, 1985; Hultgren, 1985; Jax, 1985; Watters, 1985; Wilsman, 1985) and more specifically in teaching about the family (Bubolz, 1985). Wilson and Vaines (1985) seek to extend knowledge about the relationship between the structures of knowledge within home economics and the kinds of service or professional practice arising from that knowledge. Additional conceptualizations of the field believed to be compatible with that of Brown and Paolucci are provided (Bubolz & Sontag, 1986; MacCleave-Frazier & Murray, 1984).

Other ideas emerge which make communication about home economics more difficult. When persons outside of home economics engage in criticism and at the same time ignore the contributions which its scholars make, openness of examination and communication about the field may not take place. For example, Reuben Hill, a family sociologist, says about the field:

> Home economics needs an overarching framework of concepts to provide a theoretical rationale... for so many disciplines being housed under its protective administrative umbrella. Home economics needs a set of concepts which can bridge across these several disciplines. It needs a common vocabulary of concepts to facilitate communication and make sense out of the diverse contexts its research scholars are working on.... (1984, p. 9)

Hill's suggested needs and concepts for home economics are based on his own theoretical and research focus or that of persons from other disciplines. The pioneering work of Brown and Paolucci is not cited nor is that of any other home economist. Their voices are not recognized, therefore not heard.

When the image one person holds of another or of the subject matter involved is based on myths, distortions and unexamined beliefs, conversation might not take place. For example, Valadez and Clignet remark about a concept they believe central to home economics:

> Housework has long been reduced to a collection of value-free and meaning-free techniques deserving the attention of only home economics teachers, those specialists of domestic engineering. Now this essential component of everyone's daily life has been thrust onto center stage by feminist authors, who assert that household chores are inexorably oppressive for women. (1984, p. 812)

It is apparent that these sociologists have little knowledge of the field or the work of home economists. The misrepresentation, the incorrect labeling of specialists, the lack of concern for the everyday life activities, all indicate an inability to openly reflect and engage in dialogue with home economists.

East (1980) quotes Robin Morgan who addressed the American Home Economics Association meeting in 1971.

> I gather from your literature and from the way home economics has functioned in this country that the main emphasis of your organization is to reinforce three primary areas: marriage, the family, and the issue of consumerism... Now those three areas...are three of the primary areas that the radical women's movement is out to destroy. So one could say that as a radical

feminist, I am here addressing the enemy. (p. 28)

What is the quality of mind or person a home economist is to address given beliefs of this nature? How can a conversation, a dialogue, be initiated?

Conversational barriers also exist within the field. Changes in the name and structure of home economics in academic settings, accompanied by changes in the aims or purposes of academic units, lead to different messages about home economics and its focus. Among home economics administrators there seems to be little agreement. Therefore, when a discussion occurs about whether or not home economics is an integrated field or a conglomeration of specializations, such as the discussion which took place between Nancy Belck and Keith McFarland at the 1985 Annual Meeting of the American Home Economics Association, a person cannot help wondering what view of home economics underlies their comments. For example, Belck says:

> I find the 'integrationist versus specialist' debate to be an example of 'either for or against' thinking that rings an alarm. The problem here is that we try to develop a definition of home economics that will somehow accommodate the often disparate kinds of undergraduate, graduate or other kinds of professional programs housed in contemporary home economics units. (1983, p. 56)

In contrast, McFarland's (1986) view of home economics as a "federation of career-oriented specializations" is based on several factors. He indicates that students have specialized interests, that employers and the public seek those with specialized interests, and a high level of expertise and professionals group themselves according to specialized interests, among other things. What is implicit in these views? What dimensions of home economics is each to be concerned with?

Thus entrance to the conversation has many obstacles. However, there are home economists who are ready to claim a place in the conversation. The term, "to claim," is used in the same sense as Martin (1985) employs it in distinguishing between "claiming" and "receiving" an education. To make a claim means announcing to those who would exclude, distort and devalue our field or who don't take us seriously as educators and researchers that we are ready to begin a valid and reasoned conversation and to engage in current intellectual debates in the academic world. There are more than 75 years of history of home economics, warts and all. Conceptualizations of home economics and the interrelatedness of its ideas as well as it relations to other disciplines are ready for exploration.

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Responses

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It is gratifying to find scholars in home economics taking up my invitation to enter into the conversation about ideals of the educated woman I reclaimed in my book and to project that conversation into our own future.[1] I am especially pleased that these scholars are bringing new voices into the conversational circle, enriching our understanding of the theories of those I had initially included, and clarifying the concept of conversation itself.

Isabel Bevier's name is not on the list of promising candidates I submitted for inclusion in the conversational circle.[2] Linda Peterat's paper, "Isabel Bevier: A Different Voice for Women's Education in the Mid-West," makes it clear, however, that it should have been. Bevier's vision of a differentiated education for women within a co-educational setting is extremely interesting in itself and also presents fascinating occasions for contrast with the educational philosophies of Plato, Rousseau, Wollstonecraft, Beecher, and Gilman. Embracing neither a radical separation of the sexes such as Rousseau and Beecher proposed nor Plato's co-educational premise of identical treatment for girls and boys, men and women, Isabel Bevier entertained a broad conception of co-education that allowed for differences in male and female educations. Discussions about women's education in our own time might profitably pursue her perception that Rousseau's and Plato's alternatives do not exhaust the possibilities.

If Bevier rejected the two-track educational system of Beecher's vision, she nevertheless shared the latter's belief in the scientific basis of the field they both helped create. Just as some decades earlier Beecher had insisted that domestic economy was not reducible to a set of rules for carrying on household tasks, so at the turn of this century Bevier argued that a school of household science was not to be confused with a cooking school. I have no doubt that further explication of Bevier's theory will turn up subtle yet important differences between her assumptions about the science upon which she rests her field and Beecher's, and that the educational functions she assigns household science will also be seen to differ in significant respects from those Beecher attributes to domestic economy. But this is simply to say that Peterat has done her job well. Introducing us to Bevier's voice, she makes us want to listen carefully to what Bevier has to say in a variety of interchanges with other educational thinkers.

In "Hestian Hermeneutics: A Lens of Analysis for Home Economics," Patricia Thompson supports and enriches the interpretation of Beecher's philosophy I gave in Reclaiming a Conversation. Bringing her Hestian/Hermean distinction to bear on Beecher's Treatise on Domestic Economy, she nicely contrasts the cult of true womanhood that Beecher is often thought to have been promoting with the "code of the true gentleman." I am not prepared at this point to withdraw the parallel I invoked between Rousseau's solution to the problem Emile faces as both an autonomous individual and a citizen of the state and Beecher's solution to the problem her daughters face as both autonomous individuals and good wives. Thompson's reference to Blackstone's Commentaries is well chosen, however, and the parallel she introduces definitely calls out for further development.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Thompson's discussion of Beecher, given the central role it plays in her own thinking and that of the other participants in the symposium, is her perception of the Treatise as a text on everyday life. Invoking the wonderful image of a lost Platonic form, Thompson identifies the perennial problems of daily life as Hestian concerns and, presumably, as the proper subject matter of home economics. The continuity with Bevier's thesis that the role of a school of household science was to interpret common life and its daily tasks is worth noting. Peterat's contention that the mission of the land grant college was to reach daily life and elevate its quality raises the question, however, of whether home economics is the only field whose domain this is. This question raises, in turn, the related one of whether everyday life may not outrun Hestian concerns. So that I am not misunderstood, let me stress that if a conception of home economics as the study of everyday life requires further elaboration, it does not therefore become invalid. On the contrary, in leading to new questions this conception demonstrates its theoretical fruitfulness. Moreover, the very fact that most disciplines represented in education today have far too little to say about everyday life gives home economics, so conceptualized, considerable practical importance.

As the title of Gloria Williams, Sharon Strom, and Jane Plihal's paper indicates, a daily life conception of

home economics is shared by Marjorie Brown. Francine Hultgren also stresses this aspect of Brown's philosophy. Reminding us that Brown has documented the existence in the formative years of the profession of home economics of two alternative views of the field, in "The Human Sciences and Home Economics: An Emerging Conversation," Hultgren draws an illuminating comparison between the anti-positivist alternative that Brown goes on to develop and Wilhelm Dilthey's theory of the human sciences. Yet if Brown sees home economics as a human science, Williams et al. make it clear in "Marjorie M. Brown: Initiating a Dialectic for Education and Everyday Life," that she also shared Beecher's and Bevier's vision of her field as a practical or applied science. Analyzing with Paolucci both the kind of practical knowledge home economics creates and the sorts of inquiries it encompasses, Brown concludes, as did Beecher before her, that home economics by its very nature embraces the widest possible range of disciplines.

The Hultgren and Williams et al. essays lead one to want to know more about both Brown's theory of home economics and her position on women's education. These papers do not serve only to spark our curiosity, however. Concentrating as much on Brown's efforts to further philosophical discussion among her colleagues as on her substantive philosophical ideas, Williams et al. have important things to say about the nature of communication. Hultgren, in turn, focuses on conversation itself. Although I am not sure that either side of the distinction drawn by Hans-Georg Gadamer between real and hermeneutic conversation that Hultgren introduces does full justice to the phenomenon I attempted to capture in my book, there is no doubt that the work of his she discusses provides helpful clarification of the image that runs throughout Reclaiming a Conversation and appears in the title of this symposium.

It is obviously impossible in just a few pages to touch on all the important issues raised in these papers. Hultgren's discussion of Heidegger, Williams' et al. account of dialectic, Thompson's concept of a Hestian hermeneutic, Peterat's presentation of Bevier as a woman with a dual vision are just a few of the topics that deserve attention. Moreover, Maureen Kelly's "The Female Researcher: Choice, Chance or Coincidence?" warrants a kind of review I am not really qualified to give. Even the little I have been able to say, however, should have made clear my own answer to the symposium question.

Are home economists invited to join the company and conversation of educated women? An invitation is scarcely necessary because home economists have all along participated in the ongoing philosophical conversation about women's education. Indeed, the contributions of such women as Beecher and Bevier to that conversation have been of paramount importance. To be sure, women's education is not today the only concern of home economics. To the extent, however, that the field takes as its subject matter what in my research I have been calling the reproductive processes of society, home economists have a great deal to say to those who want to lay claim to the best possible education for their daughters and also their sons. Of central importance to the education of both sexes, these societal processes are ignored by most disciplines represented in today's curriculum. That they are also ignored by many feminists does not alter the fact that home economists bring to the conversation about women's education, a conversation that necessarily is about men's education too, a much needed, much neglected perspective.

Notes

[1] Martin, Jane Roland (1985). Reclaiming a conversation: The ideal of the educated woman. New Haven: Yale University Press.

[2] Ibid, p. 177.

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I listened with care as each of you gave voice to your experience of listening to the logos of the calling that is home economics education. I understood your collective voices as an unfolding of themes that together sing of your hopes for a re-visioning of what home economics essentially is.

And in that unfolding I heard Patricia calling upon Hestia to help to restore to humankind in our time, that text which is womanhood; I heard Francine call upon Hermes to yield to us a message that brings people to authentic conversation; I heard Maureen movingly call upon the question of what it is to do research and to be a researcher in home economics; I heard Linda voicing the voices of the past as she re-heard in our times the multifold voices of Isabel Bevier; I heard Gloria recalling the voice of Marjorie Brown as she struggled to reclaim the living ground of the dialectic between finitude and infinitude, mindful of the impossibility of defining that which is beyond the finite.

We who shared your presences heard, in your collective voices, your beckoning to us to enter the horizon of the world of the hearth so that we, in the language of the dialectic (a new logic for most of us) might constitute a new beginning. You beckoned us, too, to listen to the presence of Hermes who brings tidings that may allow us more properly to dwell aright within the horizon of the world of beings. In this context, you called upon us to be mindful of re-search as a searching and searching again and as a reaching out for deeper meanings for in that reaching is the possibility of reaching into ourselves. In this call you asked us to be mindful, too, that the research gesture of reaching to grasp (aggressively positivistic) must be coupled with the gesture of reaching to receive, a gesture born of humility, without which the light of a clearing will not be present to us. In this mode of re-searching, we are able to hear more eloquently the stories of lives lived by people such as Isabel Bevier and Marjorie Brown, whose speakings and re-speakings bring into a single moment the past and the present, and as well the is and yet to be.

In this way, for me, your speakings came together with our hearings, we who came by invitation of the wording of the title of the symposium. And, as in an authentic conversation, we were moved and inspired by the mood of the venture in which you were all engaged -- a nurturing of a newly-born with much promise of new possibilities.

But you who in openness seek conversation must be mindful of those who fail to hear the unsaid, who fail to understand the language of openness you speak. You must be mindful of those whose monologic language, not attuned to the language of dialogue, would be unwittingly deaf to your call for a joint venture in "bildung" in the realm of home economics curriculum.

I feel strongly that in endeavors such as yours, you who have chosen to dwell at the edge of tradition, that it, too, might be renewed, must be mindful of the risks of ventures at such edges, of the abyss that imperils, of the strident harshness of scientism and instrumentalism that surrounds you, of the importance of being aware that the more strident the voices you hear and the more difficult the will to conversation, the more open you must be to the presence of possibilities of conversations, particularly with those who dwell on grounds that differ from yours fundamentally. Be reminded, therefore, that

> "The waterlily complains not of the stagnance of the water in which it dwells; it knows what it is to be truly a water lily."

I was pleased to hear you at the AERA symposium, and I was more strongly convinced that I was not wrong when I, some years ago, reflecting upon prevailing instrumental curriculum rationality, sensed that within the traditionally instrumentalized world of vocational education, there are new voices arising. At that time I said:

> I...sense something of things to come. I know, for instance, that within the State of Wisconsin's Department of Public Instruction, the Home Economics program is being revised within the framework of these (Habermas') orientations. I get excited by their excitement in their pioneer frontier work. For the love of me, I did not think that the field of Home Economics would be leading the curriculum people in using these orientations. (Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, 1983, 5(4), pp. 17-18).

At your San Francisco AERA symposium I re-heard your voices, true to the dialectic of deinstituting and constituting curriculum, flowing from a search for the pre-theoretical, pre-conceptual, primordial origin of what

home economics education is. These voices continue to resound within me and echo as curriculum voices attuned to the humanly good in the true measure of "home."

Thank you for allowing me, a curriculum theorist of sorts, ever in search for grounded understandings of the concrete lived world of curriculum, to experience at the symposium voices that sing in celebration of becoming -- the coming into being of a re-oriented home economics education.

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In keeping with Jane Roland Martin's spirit of conversation, I hope my comments will be taken as cooperative and constructive as well as necessarily critical. Given the messages of the papers prepared for this occasion, my impression is that home economists would categorically respond to this question[1] of invitation with a resounding "Yes!" While I am inclined to support this invitation to home economists, I want to consider some of the problematic aspects of the invitation and an affirmative response later in the discussion. There are a number of reasons why I think several different responses may be more accurate for others participating in the conversation.

> RESPONSE 1. We're not sure of what you have to say so we're not certain we want you to join the conversation with us.

This response has several important implications. It suggests that individuals in other disciplines have a number of unanswered questions about home economics. Where do home economists say what they have to say that would impact our fields and research? Where is the current conceptual/theoretical writing and conversation about home economics published? Where are conversations with other disciplines published? Are the relevant journals in home economics accessible? Are they referenced in the major citation and index services so research in home economics can be integrated into research in other fields?

Much has been said of the ongoing contributions of home economics to conversations about women's (and men's) education. The continuation of these conversations depends, in part, on the accessibility of home economics to those who wish to engage in dialogue concerning what it is that home economics is doing and what it continues to offer. In my mind, such dialogues should be possible in the research publications representative of home economics and home economists. Those interested in the field or in related research should be able to readily gain access to what is being said, by whom, where, and when.

I must confess that my personal experience in accessing research of interest to me in the field of home economics has been very dismal. Nothing short of looking through numerous individual issues of journals has made it possible for me to determine if they contained material that was applicable to what I was researching. Otherwise I could not cross-reference or locate the pertinent research in home economics with research in related fields of interest to me. I have always found this to be frustrating, disappointing, and have never understood how a mature and serious discipline could afford this inaccessibility. To provide a quick demonstration of what I mean, I picked six journals that I considered representative of home economics and 11 different indexing services that I frequently use in literature searches when I am investigating topics germane to some areas in home economics.

Table 1

Representative Home Economics Publications Listed in Related Citation and Index Services

	HOME ECONOMICS RESEARCH JOURNAL	ILLINOIS TEACHER OF HOME ECONOMICS	JOURNAL OF CONSUMER STUDIES AND HOME ECONOMICS	JOURNAL OF HOME ECONOMICS	JOURNAL OF VOCATIONAL EDUCATION RESEARCH	JOURNAL OF VOCATIONAL HOME ECON EDUCATION	TOTALS
CHILD DEVELOPMENT ABST AND BIBLIOGRAPHY	*						1
EDUCATION INDEX		*		*	*		3
HUMAN RESOURCES ABST				*			1
SAGE FAMILY STUDIES ABSTRACTS				*			1
STUDIES ON WOMEN ABSTRACTS			*				1
WOMEN STUDIES ABST							0
PSYCHOLOGICAL ABST							0
SOCIOLOGICAL ABST							0
SOCIAL SCIENCES INDEX							0
SOCIAL SCIENCES CITATION INDEX							0
CURRENT CONTENTS: SOC & BEHAV SCI							0
TOTALS	1	1	1	3	1	0	7

There are approximately 8000 different journals listed in these different indexing services. I was

[1] Reference is to the original title of the symposium "The Company and Conversation of Educated Women: Are Home Economists Invited?"

astounded at the incredible lack of listings for home economics related journals. I hope it is equally as disturbing to you. I also hope you can understand the kind of statement this makes about home economics as a discipline and how seriously it pursues theory, research, policy applications, and participation in conversations in the academic community at large. How can a field hope to be included in conversations with other disciplines when it appears to be a discipline that only talks to itself? I'm not sure that home economics even talks to itself very intelligently in comparison to other established disciplines in the social and behavioral sciences, life sciences, or the humanities. Let me consider some examples.

The commencement of publishing yearbooks by the Teacher Education Section of the American Home Economics Association (AHEA) is a great step forward in providing quality theoretical and conceptual models, frameworks, and discussions, reviews of literature and research, and teaching suggestions and models. The materials in the yearbooks are excellent, by and large, and should be distributed as widely as possible, but their circulation is minimal. There isn't another established discipline that I am aware of that doesn't regularly publish such materials plus book reviews and bibliographic essays on a frequent basis in at least one major flagship journal. In most cases, such flagship journals are distributed to those who pay annual membership fees in a related professional organization as part of their membership benefits.

I am appalled that a field that considers itself a mature, established, active, and enlightened discipline (1) does not have such a journal published by its national organization for its membership and interested scholars; (2) does not have a scholarly journal for theoretical and conceptual articles; and (3) has not worked harder to get home economics related journals listed in the major citation and index services. The second of these points could be achieved by creating a new journal, refocusing the direction, content, and target audience of the Journal of Home Economics, or by extending the focus and coverage of Home Economics Research Journal. [The new journal-to-be, Home Economics Forum, may help fill this gap.] The first point could be resolved by replacing the current membership journal with the new or redesigned journal obtained for point two. Another solution to points one and two could be met by another entity or group (other than AHEA) editing and publishing such a journal in return for memberships in the alternative organization. The third point can be accomplished by contacting the different services to learn what the criteria are for getting home economics related journals listed and then meeting those criteria.

I believe Maureen Kelly's discussion of the female researcher in home economics education can be construed in a different light if it is the case that much of the research published is only used, by design or default, by home economists who then end up talking only to themselves. The so-called plight of such researchers is perpetuated if they don't perceive or understand the relationship between having a unique way of viewing things and making the view accessible to academe and the subject for conversations across disciplines. They have a personal responsibility to provide new scholarship in home economics so it will be much more visible in the academic community and identified as a scholarly, knowledge producing field of study. If part of the unique view of everyday living that many home economists maintain they have is dependent on their perspective of integrating teaching and service in what they see and do in people-oriented activities as alluded to by Kelly, then that world view needs to be published and discussed in conversations. I do not foresee home economists being seen as good conversationalists if they are otherwise perceived as a group that engages in very little research and produces little scholarly work to offer to other disciplines. This scenario suggests another response to the invitation question.

> RESPONSE 2. It does not appear to us, given our perception of what home economics has always taught and emphasized, that you have very much to say by way of conversation with other disciplines so your company is welcome but we do not want you to join the conversation with us. The possible exception to this response hinges on your having something to say in the 1980s that is a major departure from your past focus. If this is the case, we are unaware of it because we have not known where to find such an altered contemporary perspective. We are left to assume that you have nothing new to offer and that you would seek only to reify your past focus, values, and bias. So while you're company is welcome, we don't want you to join us as conversationalists.

There are also again several important implications of this response. Such a response suggests that individuals in other disciplines have a number of unanswered questions about home economics as a field. Does home economics have things to say that are uniquely its own that are compelling, informative, useful, and helpful for dealing with social issues and problems connected with everyday living? Where is its unique perspective written and discussed? Has its uniqueness always existed in its history or is it only recently putting together what it sees to be its unique knowledge and view of everyday

living? If such uniqueness does exist, why is home economics ignored? Is it because home economics, while being relevant, is invisible and therefore not perceived? Is home economics ignored even though it is visible because it is perceived as being irrelevant?

The answers to these implied questions from Response 2 have been briefly summarized by Barbara Miller Solomon in In the Company of Educated Women: A History of Women and Higher Education (1985). She concludes that "home economics, household administration, and domestic science were all terms which focused on education for housewifery" (p. 86). Given most women's experience with the "stitchin' and sewin'" focus of home economics programs as it has been and is taught in primary and secondary schools, who then move into other fields and professions, it should not be surprising to learn that home economics has been and still is perceived, by such women, as the enemy in their concerns about the integrity of women's overall education. This perception is amplified to the degree that home economics can be argued to be a field that is gender-bound, gender-biased, and gender-selective (Martin, 1985; Solomon, 1985). It is not gender-blind or gender-sensitive (Martin, 1985) as Patricia Thompson suggests it has the possibility to be in her paper and elsewhere. She describes this possibility in the following comment of home economics' contribution to a futurist gender-free view.

> In a sense, Home Economics challenges the monopoly of individual disciplines on the stock of knowledge available to humankind by looking at knowledge from a family perspective and filtering that knowledge through a lens of analysis informed by female experience. Ultimately, the opposites of male-defined reality and female-defined reality must be synthesized in a comprehensive vision of what constitutes a worthwhile human life. Home Economics stands as the only system of knowledge established to undertake that task. (Thompson, 1985, p. 341).

In a somewhat different but related context, it is also likely that home economics will continue to be perceived, by some, as racist and classist in the same ways as much of higher education is (Harding, 1985), in spite of assertions that deny these prejudices.

> If the feminist movement was a movement for women's "liberation," it may be said that from its beginning, Home Economics has also been an emancipatory movement, but one that promotes connectiveness and caring for men as well as women. (Herrell, Hoye, & Thompson, 1984, p. 284)

These negative perceptions are likely to continue even though home economics maintains that it has always been concerned with problems of women, families, and social inequities. The following is an example of such liberatory claims:

> Since its formal inception 75 years ago, the field of Home Economics has been unique: it has always affirmed the roles of women as homemakers and/or wage earners. Home Economics has consistently sought--through research and education--to address the problems of women and families in everyday living and to correct the social inequities affecting women and families through education, community service, and political action. (Bovy, 1984, p. 293)

Solomon also points out that home economics has seldom provided young women with role models in academe of anything other than well-educated single women. In more recent years as married women have found positions in higher education, women students have found role models for balancing a career and a marriage. Still largely missing however, are role models for the many young women who aspire to juggle a profession, a marriage, and the bearing and rearing of children. This suggests there are a number of factors that contribute to the absence of such role models in combining careers or vocations in home economics and everyday life. One factor with considerable historic precedent is that many of the home economists in academe are not married and are usually without children or they are married but do not usually have young children. Another factor may be that it is very difficult to juggle such a combination of activities on a day-to-day basis. Or the juggling is possible, but few do it in ways that allow the juggling of employment, family, and home activities to inform or to be made visible in their research, teaching, and interaction with peers and students. Consequently, by overshadowing the complexity of everyday living through a pre-occupation with career selection and vocational training, home economics appears to many to be offering an oversimplified view of the problems of everyday reality.

Thompson's paper and several of her recent discussions (1984, 1986) could be construed to play into this criticism about role models because of her selection of Hestia as a goddess-model for home economists. While Hestia is the goddess of the hearth, she is also the goddess least likely to be involved emotionally with a spouse, children, and friends (Bolen, 1984). Kathryn Rabuzzi (1982) also suggests that Hestia is the goddess most likely to think that everyone will "live happily ever after." I do not think this is the image that home economics wants to make and maintain in its conversation with other disciplines.

With one camp having identified home economics as the enemy and home economists feeling they are hardly worthy

of such a distinction, I think it would be useful to sort through some of these differences in perception. With Response 1 and Response 2 already on the record, I believe there is a more complimentary view to be had of home economists as conversationalists. I think many home economists would agree with the following response to the question of invitation.

> RESPONSE 3. We know home economists have many compelling things to say about the subjects of interest to us. So please come, join the conversation, and enlighten us. We all know that home economics has a history with a unique view and understanding of the everyday experience of women that is important for us to learn and apply.

All of the presented papers assert that home economics has a unique view of everyday life that has always been part of its history and heritage and that much of it is directly related to education. What is the nature of this uniqueness? Thompson, Hultgren, Kelly, and Peterat all discuss this to some degree in their respective paper's particular contexts. They all agree on the uniqueness of home economic's view of everyday living in home, family, and the female world. However, I constantly found myself wanting and waiting for them to describe what they uniquely see about everyday living in home, family, and the female world. To my knowledge, descriptions or examples of such insights are not included in these papers to any substantive degree. Most descriptions were rooted in a return to the past, either couched in principles and perspectives taught in the past, or in the analyses of texts drawn from the past. I found very little of the descriptions to be informed by the authors' everyday living experience or how the descriptions might reflect the embeddedness of the authors in a uniquely female perspective.

The positive nature of Response 3 depends on a perception of home economics as a field that has this unique view of the world that would impact the education of women. Negative opinions of this response are based largely on the belief that home economics does not have a unique and relevant view. In support of the assertion that home economics does have a unique view, the following statement captures well its essence and significance:

> A well-established tenet of feminism is that "the personal is political." This is true of Home Economics as well. The question was not whether women were uniquely suited to the domestic sphere, but <u>whether the domestic sphere supported the need for a unique knowledge system grounded in female experience and epistemology</u> [emphasis mine]. (Thompson, 1984, p. 321)

Unfortunately, so far this emphasis seems to have been used only as an epistemological consideration and therefore it fails to raise the same issue at an ontological level. Feminists have recently raised this question at both the ontological (Whitbeck, 1984) and the epistemological (Gould, 1984; Harding & Hintikka, 1983) levels. But for the most part, feminists have left the home and family out of their questions. And while home economists have focused on the home and family in asking the epistemological question, they have not raised the ontological question using the home, family, and female world of experience.

> The philosophical framework of Home Economics provides a means of posing knowledge questions related to everyday activities. Yet feminists and Women's Studies scholars have both contributed to the "invisibility" of Home Economics. (Thompson, 1984, p. 335)

Feminist's critique of home economics (and its invisibility) can be attributed, in part, to their failure to ask the ontological question. The critique of feminism that is often made by home economists often takes the form of the following conclusion:

> In the past, Home Economics was dismissed pejoratively as a "woman's field." Today, this would be considered a source of professional pride. It might be -- were it not for the negative consequences of sexual stereotyping that continues to plague Home Economics.... Part of this may involve reclaiming those parts of the Home Economics movement that were grounded in female experience and life activity and that have been rejected and repressed by many feminists. Do feminists find Home Economics threatening because -- like many men -- they have devalued everything traditionally associated with woman's self-defined sphere -- the home? (Merrell, Hoye, & Thompson, 1984, p. 281)

Another criticism that can be made of home economics is in the way it compartmentalizes the everyday experiences of women. Home economists argue that they have good reasons for doing this, as suggested in the following quote.

> Home economics is alone among the social science disciplines to carry, implicit in its practice (praxis), the notion of the severance of the manager-mother (as caregiver) functions -- one a household function, the other a family function (p. 181).... Woman has been constrained by her domestic role and the boundaries of the female world as defined by a male-dominated patriarchal society. Home Economics has addressed this

> issue differently from feminism. By implicitly segmenting the managerial and the maternal functions, yet seeing them as both practically and symbolically interwoven, Home Economics has sought to free women from "oppression" by addressing these problems from the standpoint of a changing knowledge base and through the process of technology transfer to reduce household drudgery. (Costantakos, 1984, p. 191)

Dorothy Smith, a sociologist of knowledge, points out a serious problem with this practice in the context of time use studies:

> Applications of time-budget methods to comparisons between the amount of work women do in the home and the amount of work men do outside and inside the home have simply adapted the distinction between work and leisure in such a way that the kinds of responsibilities women take in relation to the home and to the children simply do not appear. The work/leisure organization applies to employment. The sociological concepts are borrowed directly from it. If we started with housework as a basis, the categories of "work" and "leisure" would never emerge. And indeed, it is hard to imagine how, using housework as our basic framework, it would be possible to make "work" and "leisure" observable [emphasis mine]. The organization of the role of housewife, mother, and wife does not conform to the divisions between being at work and not being at work. Even the concept of housework as work leaves what we do as mothers without a conceptual home. (Smith, 1979, p. 154)

Smith's primary concern is that this traditional way of viewing women's everyday living "produces an odd division between housework and what we do as mothers which in no way conforms to the actuality of experience" (1981, p. 3). I see this as a major flaw in home economics' epistemology and feminism's ontology and epistemology -- they all cast the nature of women's experience in the home in a way that leaves what they do as homemaker, parent, spouse, employee, invisible. The fact that such work in the home frees others up to do other things is not seen as a condition and opportunity that follows from having someone in the background on a predictably consistent basis doing particularly unique things -- unique to caregiving in the home. Such services are easily taken for granted or viewed as a trap. Both feminism and home economics has missed this ontological difference.

It is compelling to me that home economics sees itself as having a unique view of the world that takes women's world of experience as its starting point and that many other women do not see home economics having such a view. I believe part of the problem is centered around home economics' lack of scholarship in articulating its unique view. Merrell, Hoye, and Thompson (1984) think the problem resides primarily within feminist circles and their not seeing the light. They have stated:

> Part of the problem -- both theoretically and practically -- may stem from a failure on the part of feminists to acknowledge the ideology implicit in the Home Economics movement.... As women scholars revisit the idea of women in the home and suggest alternative ways of looking at the life cycle of women, they must also revisit home economics. (p. 285)

But I think the major source of confusion on both sides of the matter stems from neither group actually having seen and articulated an alternative world view to the ones they are operating within now -- in spite of their assertions otherwise. There is much in what they see that is still couched in masculist categories and world views. At this point in time, I see more being done in this area by a small number of researchers -- mostly feminists (for a sample, see Appendix A).

One of the major characteristics of much of this work is that it is based on a different ontological and epistemological foundation. In all of the presented papers here, each of the authors utilized some form of dualism in her explanation. All utilized some variation of the private/public, nature/culture, reproductive/productive, personal/political, or Hestian/Hermean. Thompson-Tetreault (1985) identifies this focus of study as bifocal scholarship, the third of five different phases of theory in her "Feminist Phase Theory." (See Table 2 for a summary of her typology.) The dualisms discussed in the different presented papers are treated in some cases as polarities (opposites), as complementary features or traits, or as elements, traits, or characteristics that exist in some type of dialectical tension. While it is the case that these dualistic categories are useful for studying their variation over time and across cultures, they obscure the everyday living that isn't qualifiable as either/or; that may be bits and pieces of both plus a few more; and may be contradictory in some ways and compatible in other ways at the same time and place. "Not only can the personal be political, for example, but both politics and personal life are bound up with other matters not easily classifiable either as political or as personal" (Whitbeck, 1984, p. 76).

Table 2

An Evaluation Model of Feminist Phase Theory[1]

1. MALE SCHOLARSHIP The absence of women is not noted. There is no consciousness that the male experience is "particular knowledge" selected from a wider universe of possible knowledge and experience. It is valued, emphasized, and viewed as the knowledge most worth having.

2. COMPENSATORY SCHOLARSHIP The absence of women is noted. There is a search for missing women according to the male norm of greatness, excellence, or humanness. Women are considered as exceptional, deviant, or "other". Women are added into the traditional structure of the discipline but the structure and methodology are not challenged.

3. BIFOCAL SCHOLARSHIP Human experience is conceptualized primarily in dualist categories: male and female; private and public; agency and communion; productive and reproductive. Emphasis is on a "complementary but equal" conceptualization of men's and women's spheres and personal qualities. There is a focus on women's oppression and misogyny. Women's efforts to overcome that oppression are presented. Efforts to include women lead to the insight that the traditional content, structure, and methodology of the disciplines are more appropriate to the male experience.

4. FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP Scholarly inquiry pursues new questions, new categories, and new notions of significance which illuminate women's traditions, history, culture, values, visions, and perspectives. A pluralistic conception of women emerges which acknowledges diversity and recognizes that other variables besides gender shape women's lives; for example, race, ethnicity, and social class. Efforts are made to reconceptualize knowledge to encompass the female experience.

5. MULTIFOCAL, RELATIONAL SCHOLARSHIP A multifocal, gender balanced perspective is sought which serves to fuse women's and men's experiences into a holistic view of human experience. At this stage, scholars are conscious of particularity, while at the same time identifying common denominators of experience. They begin to define what binds together and what separates the various segments of humanity.

[1]Source: Adapted from Thompson-Tetreault, 1985, pp. 368-372.

Underneath the dualisms referenced in these articles is the fundamental ontological base of self vs. other as opposed to the interconnection of self and other. Even such notables as Martin, Gilligan, Chodorow, Bolen, Beecher, Swallow-Richards, Bevier, Heidegger, Dilthey, and Gadamer presume a fundamental tension between the self and any other self. This is characteristic of thinking one is wearing women-focused glasses when they actually are masculist. The assumption is that looking at women is the same as looking through women-focused lens. Many nonfeminists and feminists alike wear such lens without noticing how they shape perceptions. It has only been in the last few years that anyone has constructed an ontology that doesn't pit the self against the other or other individuals. Caroline Whitbeck (1984), a feminist philosopher, has done much to bring this ontology into visibility. In this framework, an ethics of care can be articulated from the ontological interconnection and subjectivity of all people rather than the disconnection and objectivity that comes from being a self being-in-the-world or a self at odds with others. Such an ethic can then be combined and differentiated from ethics with duties, rules, and rights.

From this vantage point, a different view of the world can be constructed that locates the study and conceptualization of the home and family in a framework that enables the embedded and interconnected relationship between the family and the home to be more accurately seen and understood. As an organizing principle of the program, the home is seen as a household, dwelling place, and environment wherein the individuals and families living in it are embedded or nested and interconnected.

The home as an organizing principle and a central focus for the family and its study, is explicitly designed to establish the conceptual and stabilizing importance of the home as a unique environment characterized by particularistic and shared meanings, functions, rituals, services, transactions, rituals, and temporal patterns. This emphasis acknowledges that much of home living is organized and conceptualized differently when the home and not the school or workplace is the major context for conceptualizing the study of the everyday life and the family.

Underlying this focus on the home and family is an emphasis on the importance of services provided in homes and families that are usually devalued, taken for granted, and not seen by others unless the work is not done or the services are not provided as expected. Such services are usually performed in homes and families by individuals (usually women) having the primary or sole responsibilities for nurturing and caring for others. In many homes and families, the individual who performs these services and provides the family with its major source of income are the same individual. This emphasis is designed to help people learn to recognize, value, and understand the central place of these otherwise "invisible" services to maintaining meaningful relationships, insuring continuity in the lives of those served, and providing for meaningful and caregiving activities in the home, family, and community. These services and how they are provided by those who render them are made visible in a representative and legitimate view of the world only if the services become the central organizing principle for that world view. Such a view for studying the home and family and the environments in which they are embedded does not currently exist in the academic community.

Smith describes the everyday world as seen through this view in the following summary:

> The housewife...becomes rather highly skilled at holding together and coordinating the threads and shreds of several lines of action, the projects of more than one individual, while herself pursuing none.... What is required is a subordination of attentiveness to self and a focus on others, the lack of development of an independent project organizing relevances and, in contrast, an openness and attentiveness to cues and indications of others' needs. A housewife, holding in place the simultaneous and divergent schedules and activities of a family, depends upon a diffuse and open organization of consciousness available to the various strands, which are coordinated only in her head and by her work and do not coordinate otherwise in the world. And again, we who have done both or do

> both types of work (home/family and employment) can report on how the individually undertaken project of our work seriously impair and disorganize our ability to sustain the modes of consciousness required for a peak performance in the role of housewife. (1979, pp. 151-152)

The locus of this world view is the position of individuals who see themselves inseparably connected in relations with others who engage their world of experience with creating, preserving, caring, and nurturing as their primary values. In this view of the world, living is typified by interruption, discontinuity, lack of completion, and a constant juggling of attention to other individuals and their different needs, schedules, activities, and preferences. It is carried out in a different mode of organizing consciousness. Ontologically I believe we would find that the individual taking such responsibility for caregiving would have a categorically different view of the world. Such a world view and ontology still remains out of the conversation in the present. In these contexts of interaction and shared meaning, home and family resource management are reconceptualized more fittingly as the orchestration of homemaking. This conceptualization and synthesis of the home and family makes it possible, using a different perspective, to educate women and men about their interdependence and connectedness with others, their capabilities for providing services for one another, and several important ways in which they see aspects of the home differently.

In Reclaiming a Conversation: The Ideal of the Educated Woman, Jane Roland Martin (1985) argues that education must be "gender-sensitive" (p. 195) instead of gender-related. Education is embedded in productive activities of the public sphere and is totally ignorant of reproductive activities. There are very few discussions that combine the reproductive and productive or the private and public to show how they are almost always present in tandem. Education (including home economics) needs "to raise to consciousness the hidden curriculum of schooling: its denigration of women and the tasks, traits, and functions our culture associates with them" (p. 197). The new and ever increasing scholarship on women must be integrated into all education curriculums.

> Such efforts must be undertaken at all levels of schooling, for it is too little, too late, too elitist to postpone until the college years the revelations of the new research. Another essential step is to build nurturing capacities and an ethics of care into the curriculum itself. (Martin, 1985, p. 197)

These and other elements can combine to "enable us to discern ways to bring educational practice into tune with the full range of people's lives and with the present perils to life on earth" (p. 199).

We are at a time when all fields concerned about the family are having some kind of identity and definitional crisis. I believe this is a good time for home economics to lay claim to a wider range of territorial issues that can be organized around their potentially different ontological and epistemological world views. There is much to claim and reframe. But it ought to be done by a scholarly discipline that can look at and organize the world in a different way. One that will create a knowledge base reflecting that unique view. And finally, one that will take the responsibility to enter the knowledge and scholarship into future conversations with other scholars across many other disciplines. I most certainly believe it is possible for home economics to accomplish this, if they are willing to pay the price of good scholarship, to publish and be informed conversationalists.

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Appendix A

FOR FURTHER CONVERSATION

WOMEN'S SCHOLARSHIP IN ACADEME

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Continuing the Conversation

Francine H. Hultgren

As we in the symposium entered conversation together in the spirit of Gadamer, allowing ourselves to be conducted by the object of our conversation (home economists in the company and conversation of educated women), it would be forthcoming to question the meaning and nature of Donald Herrin's response as discussant to this conversation. Was he really allowing the direction to come from what our object of conversation was about, or was he himself seeking to direct that object according to his predetermined view? Furthermore, I would have to question if he saw us as human beings come together to talk, to listen, and to learn from one another (as Martin sees conversation), or if he approached us as adversaries? He said he wanted his comments to be seen as cooperative but also critical. But one would have to ask what is the chance for "opening the way to conversation" when persons enter with a critical intent seen through closed vision? The answer might lie in the questioning -- what questions call forth a new seeing of possibilities? Aoki provides a sensitivity to this when he acknowledges our search for the pre-theoretical origin of our re-oriented view of home economics. Martin also opens the way by the invitation to further elaboration of the questions home economics brings to the study of everyday life. The conversation which follows is intended in a search for the possibility of understanding which might enable our "seeing and saying" to go on. This conversation is patterned after a dialogue Heidegger (1971) conducts on the nature of language.

Inquirer: In order to understand the contribution of home economists to this conversation, I must first inquire about what gives rise to the question being asked: Are home economists invited? Why should this question be asked, and in whose realm is it to decide?

Home Economist: The question arose from within in an attempt to reach beyond -- a searching by home economists to give voice to that which engages us in the broader conversation of humankind. Speaking implies hearing, but if you have been consistently "not heard," you encounter the problematic nature and control of language and possibility of not having words for what you want to say. So the question of who is to decide our acceptance might be restated to ask: How might we ensure that the other persons in our conversation are with us so that we might meet the first condition of conversation (conversations are entered by those who truly have an interest in what the other has to say).

Inquirer: So would you not, then, expect a response from some who might not share that interest with you -- and you would rather judge you harshly by failing to see your commonalities or appreciate your uniqueness?

Home Economist: It is that very occurrence which might allow the pursuit of meaning in that which is said. Rather than being rendered angry or defensive by such judgments, we can begin to ask the meaning of such judgments. We can pursue the central hermeneutic question: How do we distinguish the true prejudices by which we understand from the false ones by which we misunderstand?

Inquirer: What false prejudice do you see in the response to your question: Are home economists invited?

Home Economist: If someone is not sure of what we have to say on the basis of our conversation not appearing in citation and index services, what does that assume about knowledge and how it is created? If the language of our conversation shifts everything into the objective (theoretical), what opportunity exists for us to bring into view what claims our existence as home economists? It might be as Heidegger has said: the language of our dialogue might constantly destroy the possibility of saying that of which we are speaking.

Inquirer: What is it, then, of which you are speaking? How can we be brought nearer to what is unsaid?

Home Economist: We are not speaking about home economics as if it were an object or a commodity, but we are speaking from home economics as we find ourselves in relation with others in the world, including that relation as founded in the past. Contrary to Herrin's interpretation that our ontological base is self vs. other, it is very much self with other (an in-dwelling), and in our "saying, it is that which we seek to let appear or shine through.

Inquirer: Is there a true prejudice about home economics which might help us to understand?

Home Economist: It is not so much that we have a unique view of everyday life in families, but is it the way in which we are responsive to the voices that

speak to us through lived experience rather than through the categorical abstractions of knowledge found in schemas, models, and theories. The human interest, then, comes first, and in listening to that voice, we become more aware. We would ask for the same kind of listening to our voices as home economists as we seek essential meanings in our human encounters with others. Our relation to the nature of everyday life in families will not be found if the demand for information comes only through the formally published theoretical knowledge. In the hermeneutic intent, it is not only our interpretation that is called for, but even before that it is the bearing of the message -- the tidings -- that allows us to dwell together. If we are heard as messengers from home economics rather than about home economics, the chance for authentic conversation emerges. If we can be heard in the language we bring, rather than being heard only by what others already understand, we may all become more mindful of our relation to each other.

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Patricia J. Thompson

It is inspiring, in the sense of adding a new breath of life, to hear the voices of Ted T. Aoki and Jane Roland Martin joined in the spirit of our invitation to conversation. To pursue my Hestian metaphor, their comments shine like the rays of the ancient hearth to penetrate the dark and draw us into community, communication, and shared meaning. I am frankly puzzled by Donald Herrin's response, for he appears to be heeding voices other than those present at the symposium. Perhaps this dissonance dramatizes the dilemma of men working in a woman-defined discipline such as home economics. What I hear him saying is that home economics is not "Hermean" enough to suit him. To engage in conversation presupposes the art of listening to what is being said. It requires the capacity to be attuned to silences and unsaids, and sensitive to the social forces that contribute to social invisibility.

In responding to our invitation, Ted T. Aoki is clearly standing in our space and place -- aware that it is <u>different</u> from that in which other academic disciplines are grounded. In continuing our conversation, we must now ask ourselves, "Do we dwell at the <u>edge</u>, or do we dwell at the <u>center</u>?" In addressing this question, home economists have the opportunity to reach back to an earlier stage of human thought -- to primal ideas and primal words -- that predates the fragmented and instrumental categories of thought that characterize male-defined disciplines and discourse of the present. The powerful structures of patriarchy (both institutional and intellectual) render women invisible, mute their voices, and distort their message. Because of this, feminist home economists must go beyond gender to critique patriarchal assumptions that trap both men and women in a distorted view of reality. It is good to be reminded that in home economics, as in other disciplines, we can contribute to an understanding of the "pre-theoretical, pre-conceptual, and primordial origin" of both our human essence and our human discipline.

It is always illuminating to encounter (in the deepest sense of the word) the reasoned cadences of Jane Roland Martin's philosophical perspective. There is no need for Martin to withdraw her comparison of Beecher with Rousseau since the points she makes are clearly valid. However, I would like to see not only Rousseau and Beecher, but Plato, Wollstonecraft, Gilman, and others re-viewed from the perspective of a Hestian hermeneutic. I believe that to do so would cast more light on the intricate relationship of the reproductive and productive processes of society which Martin has identified. We must see both processes in relation to the <u>oikos</u> and the <u>polis</u> for a revised version of the "educated person."

I would not claim that home economics is the <u>only</u> field whose domain encompasses the "everyday." I do think that Hermean intervention (which constitutes patriarchal hegemony and hierarchical control) has sundered such Hestian professionals as social work, nursing, and teaching from each other and turned them into competitive systems of human "service." Reclaiming the concept of "household science" as Martin does affords a fresh opportunity to ask how a Hestian science -- one strongly imbued with female-defined questions and values -- would differ from the science we know. Feminist scholars such as Carolyn Merchant, Evelyn Fox Keller, and Ruth Bleier have already hinted at some fundamental differences. The recovery of a "Hestia-neutic" in place of a "Herme-neutic" (as Linda Peterat has suggested to me in conversation) may be an essential task to enable us to examine issues related to science and technology, human ecology, peace, and war. For now I would say that such early language dilemmas as whether to call the emerging woman's discipline "household/domestic science," "household/domestic engineering," "household/domestic art," "household/domestic economy," all point to Hermean control of language to the disadvantage of women in their struggles to be heard. Perhaps it is time to return to the idea of "euthenics," the art and science of "right living," as proposed by Ellen Swallow Richards, who was both a scientist and a founder of the home economics discipline.

What are we to make of Herrin's comments? While responding to the title of the symposium, he has scarcely entered into the substantive ideas of the papers. He avoids engagement with the ideas presented. His are the questions of one who stands outside the conversational circle to launch a critique of the profession as a whole. His questions seem, on their face, to be reasonable enough. However, his catalog of deficiencies in the dissemination of our ideas seems to be saying, "You are not Hermean enough for me to feel comfortable in your presence." Herrin's frustration with the knowledge system of patriarchy as an obstacle to accessing relevant home economics literature should tell him something. Let me

remind him that the chapter from which he quotes so extensively ("Home Economics: A Knowledge System -- Not a Gender System") closes with an appeal not to let patriarchal power masquerade as Truth! The present paper continues in that vein, utilizing the emancipatory vision provided by feminism to explain why home economics is rendered both voiceless and invisible. Does Herrin not know the function of gatekeepers in maintaining the patriarchal status quo? Does he not recognize the biases implicit in the male-dominated research community committed to the "positivist-instrumentalist" Hermean paradigm? What counts as research? What counts as "scholarship?" How does "peer review" perpetuate ruling patriarchal elites and crush divergent points of view? Who funds and supports research and publication? Critique that helps us strip away this perpetuation of false consciousness is badly needed. Who determines what is "compelling, informative, and useful?" By what standard are these criteria measured? Hestian and Hermean criteria would differ. I would respond to Herrin that Hestia is not being proposed as a "goddess model" at all, but as a metaphor for the "other," as a way of proposing the existence of a "female-defined" as well as a "male-defined" sphere of human action. In his gratuitous remarks on the personal lives of home economists, Herrin reveals a chauvinistic streak. However, since the question of marital status and parental status have been raised, without supporting empirical evidence, I might add, let's ask the same questions about male academics. And what would we find? The Hestian work of their everyday existence is probably provided by those holding the status "wife," "secretary," or "research assistant." I would have to conclude that Herrin's comments confirm that patriarchy is alive and well and that his attitude would benefit from feminist consciousness raising. A raised consciousness is as important as a reading list in understanding what is being said.

Linda Peterat

In studying the times and ideas of Isabel Bevier, I am caught by the un-easing notion that the ideals for which she struggled have been lost rather than gained in the past 80 years. Not permitting a total surrender to despair, I rather continue to ask why (until recently) the debate over appropriate kinds of education for men and women has been absent from our broader educational conversations? We have come to take for granted our past and future as women and home economists. We women seem strongly to be repeating what Bevier believed we had already proven by the turn of the century, that women could compete and achieve in male forms of knowledge. Yet many of our struggles in recent decades have been on this same ground, for example, to direct women into non-traditional occupations, to encourage (or require) females to study more mathematics and science. Much of our recent educational conversation focuses on comparisons of scores, tests and measurements, rather than ideals for education. Through questioning our history in examining the life and ideals of one of the founders of home economics, we question the present.

Bevier's notion of a different education reflecting women's interests in the home and under the control of women; within a co-educational setting, and available to men and women is indeed an ideal challenging to realize even today. We may glean from Bevier's efforts that our task is to re-shape the valuing structures of society rather than focusing on convincing women of the value of the work they do. On this point many feminists and home economists stand in agreement as they envision a future in which values traditionally associated with men and women hold equal value in practice and policy of the society.

Entering Bevier's world, we are offered a picture of the various dimensions of her struggle to advance the field of home economics; her work in the university, public schools, extension, professional associations, and her claim to her students that the ultimate goal was "gracious womanhood." The question emerges in the current climate of receding feminism as to what is necessary for maintaining this struggle. The parade passes and the next generation falls into step confident that things have changed, concessions have been won and their future will be different. The question emerges of what it would mean to sustain the compelling quality present in becoming, in creating. This is a pedagogical question posing for disciplines besides home economics. Mathematics and science, for example, are taught devoid of life, offering cold, hard death rather than the life of creativity, the fire of the quest of the mathematician or scientist. How do we sustain the life, the creativity, the becoming of any discipline, inviting the company and conversation of future generations of women and men scholars? Such a regenerative quality seems essential to any discipline, and possible particularly within disciplines of the cultural and social realm.

Exploring Bevier's work offers us a story of our past and a regenerative spark in orienting our present and future. She offers us a perspective on what is, what might be and is not yet.

Gloria M. Williams
Sharon M. Strom
Jane Plihal

Having an opportunity to respond to the Aoki, Herrin, and Martin papers amplifies the meaning and significance of dialogue and the use of the dialectic as a mode of inquiry for arriving at truth, meaningful, and reasonable beliefs in theoretical as well as practical arenas. In describing serious as opposed to casual discussions, Joh (1975) identifies two necessary conditions which participants in the debate must bring to the setting: (1) those based on the principles of critical and rational thought and (2) those incorporating moral and attitudinal principles.

We have chosen to respond in terms of the nature of ideology implicit in the above papers which we believe subsume many issues. Of the three ways in which the term "ideology" may be used to explicate epistemological assumptions, Geuss (1981) suggests two which are pertinent to our response: (1) ideology in a positive sense and (2) ideology in a pejorative sense. These usages will be clarified in the following sections of this paper as we explore the kinds of questions the respondents brought to the dialectic. We end our response by re-extending the invitation to dialogue in order to further our understanding of home economics as a professional field of study.

Ideology as Positive

In several ways, each of the respondents directs our attention to questions about the philosophical foundations of home economics. Herrin challenges the ontological and epistemological grounding of the field. He wants to know: What really is the case? What is the field about? What is the view of the world that sets the particular perspective of home economics apart, the system of explanation that helps to "fit" it together? Herrin suggests a conceptual framework for home economics as a professional field of study -- a way of organizing substantive concepts about the home, the family, and everyday life, for example. He states several propositions which he believes are fundamental to this view and basic for education in the field. Most certainly, his view requires examination with respect to that provided by Brown (1985) in her most recent publication. Aoki reminds us that re-thinking, re-defining, and re-searching for meaning in the themes, ideas, language, and other phenomena basic to home economics, is a requisite as fields of study gain maturity, direction, and leadership. Re-examination helps to clarify our reason for being, our distinctiveness as a field, and our differentiation from other fields oriented toward human interests.

Each of the respondents raises questions about certain basic terms in home economics. For example, the meaning of the concept of everyday life in home economics, its clarity, and its differentiation and/or relatedness to usage in other disciplines is challenged by Herrin. Martin, however, encourages us to further elaborate upon this conception and what she refers to as the reproductive processes of society -- an idea essentially ignored by other disciplines and apparent in the new voices to the conversation -- those of Bevier and Brown.

Wheelwright (1960) reminds us that each of the above challenges -- the nature of a field of human interest and investigation and its relations to other fields of similar concern, the key terms and concepts employed, the propositions set forth as a requisite condition for systematic inquiry to occur -- comprise problems a dialectic may address. Seeking truth, meaningfulness and reasonableness in beliefs meets the first condition for serious discussion and respect for persons.

When questions and challenges such as the above are raised, they rest on a positive ideology. Participants in the conversation assume a critical and reflective attitude recognizing that home economists create and construct their own intellectual realities and interests. As the third group of respondents which Herrin represents say, home economists come to the conversation to enlighten, to inform others of their views, ideas, interpretations and values held. We turn now to the second way in which ideology is implicit in the responses.

Ideology as False Consciousness

Geuss (1981) poses the question for us. "In what sense or in virtue of what properties can a form of consciousness be ideologically false, i.e., can it be an ideology in the pejorative sense?" (p. 13). He identifies three properties of beliefs which support an ideologically false consciousness: (1) epistemic, (2) functional, and (3) genetic. To illustrate the existence of a false consciousness underlying the responses, some critical questions will be raised with respect to each of these

properties. The questions are not meant to be exhaustive, merely examples.

A form of consciousness has epistemic properties when questions arise concerning whether or not (1) consciously stated beliefs are supported by available empirical evidence and (2) descriptive beliefs are confused with normative beliefs. In what way is the evidence about the accessibility of home economics knowledge valid, reliable and meeting qualitative standards of empirical research? Does the evidence support the view that home economics knowledge is unavailable? Is scientific rationality the only mode of rational thought? In what ways do negative images and judgments contribute to truth-seeking, moral concerns of a discipline, and the principle of fairness in a serious discussion? Are these beliefs used in a context of justification to exclude home economists from the conversation?

Turning to the functional properties of a form of consciousness which is ideologically false, in what sense do the beliefs and attitudes of the respondents support and legitimize social institutions and practices? Are home economists fully responsible for the actions of gatekeepers of established journals, for the practices of informational and indexing sources? Is it reasonable to believe that the invitation to home economists to come to the conversation but not to be heard reflects a paternalistic attitude? Or do the negative judgments about home economics, its scholarship and other expressed beliefs reflect the myth of hierarchical power in the academy? What does it mean when comments which insult, repress and enforce frustration are heaped upon one discipline by another? Are these intended to be self-fulfilling, self-serving?

Genetic properties of a form of consciousness are concerned with "facts about its origin, genesis, or history, about how it arises or comes to be acquired or held..." (Geuss, 1981, p. 19). Is it reasonable for home economists to look to the past, to re-think, re-direct, re-define or re-turn to the context of discovery as justification for the field of study and its future? Is it justifiable for respondents to assume that the interests and stereotypes of feminists represent reality for and the real interests of home economists? Is it reasonable to believe that many home economics voices seek truth and meaningfulness for their field? In what way do role-models form the basis for knowledge to develop? An ideology in the pejorative sense is neither conducive to open and critical dialogue nor respect for persons; the opposite is guaranteed.

Where to From Here?

Like Brown and Paolucci (1979), we re-extend the invitation to dialogue, to engage in the tensions of dialectic as we explore meaning and truth together. We hope that the problems of dialectic identified and the bringing to consciousness of those factors conducive to and discouraging to dialogue are helpful. A quotation from O'Neill (1974) helps bring closure to our response:

> Every approach needs to presume upon its reception. And, so, in beginning we never fear that we shall be wholly misunderstood... To begin is confidently part of the work of building and sharing an understanding. It is ideally the institution of making sense together within a common life and a common world. (p. 1)

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